Feelings as information: informational and motivational functions of affective states by Schwarz, Norbert
www.ssoar.info
Feelings as information: informational and
motivational functions of affective states
Schwarz, Norbert
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Forschungsbericht / research report
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Schwarz, N. (1989). Feelings as information: informational and motivational functions of affective states. (ZUMA-
Arbeitsbericht, 1989/03). Mannheim: Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen -ZUMA-. https://nbn-
resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-66871
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Feelings as Information 
Informational and Motivational
Functions of Affective States
Norbert Schwarz
•ZUMA-Arbeitsbericht Nr. 89/G3
Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und 
Analysen e.V. (ZUMA)
Postfach 12 21 55
D-6800 Mannheim 1
Seit Juli 1983 sind die ZUMA-Arbeitsberichte 
in zwei Reihen aufgeteilt:
Die ZUMA-Arbeitsberichte (neue Folge) haben 
eine hausinterne Begutachtung durchlaufen und 
werden vom Geschäftsführenden Direktor zusam­
m e n  mit den ü b r i g e n  Wissenschaftlichen Lei­
tern herausgegeben. Die Berichte dieser Reihe 
sind zur a l l g e m e i n e n  Weitergabe nach außen 
bestimmt.
D i e  Z U M A - T e c h n i s c h e n  Berichte dienen zur 
hausinternen K o m m u n i k a t i o n  bzw. zur U n t e r ­
r i c h t u n g  e x t e r n e r  Kooperationspartner. Sie 
s i n d  nicht zur allgemeinen W e i t e r g a b e  b e ­
stimmt .
The attached reprint replaces ZUMA-Arbeitsbericht No. 89/03 by 
the same author.
Schwarz, Norbert. Feelings as information: Informational 
and motivational functions of affective states. In E. T. 
Higgins, & R- Sorrentino (Eds.)/ Handbook of motivation and 
cognition: Foundations of social behavior (Vol. 2) . New 
York: Guilford, 1990.


HANDBOOK OF
MOTIVATION AND 
COGNITION
Foundations of Social Behavior
VOLUME 2
Edited by
E. Tory Higgins
Columbia University
Richard M. Sorrentino
University of Western Ontario
THE GUILFORD PRESS 
New York • London
M i*

CHAPTER 15
Feelings as Information
Informational and Motivational 
Functions of Affective States
NORBERT SCHWARZ
Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen, ZUMA 
and University of Heidelberg
A key e lem en t in m any theories o f em otio n  is th e  o fte n  im p licit assu m p tion  that 
"e m o tio n s  ex ist fo r the sake o f signaling sta tes o f  the w orld that have to be 
responded to, o r that no longer need resp onse and actio n " (F rijd a , 1988 , p. 354). 
Su rp risin g ly , th is assu m p tion  has received little  a tten tio n  in psychological th eo ­
rizing  about the interp lay  o f affect and cogn ition . R a th e r , recent research on 
em otio n al in flu en ces on  cognitive processes has focused p rim arily  on  the im pact 
o f  em o tio n s on th e  valence o f  m aterial that is recalled  from  m em ory  (see  B laney,
1 986 , and Isen , 198 4 b , for review s). A ccordingly, studies on  the im pact o f  e m o ­
tional states on  reason in g  and judgm ent have been  characterized  by attem p ts to 
trace the observed  e ffects  to selective recall.
In co n trast to this research tradition, the p resen t ch ap ter focuses on  the 
in form ativ e  fu n ctio ns o f affective sta tes ; it is based on the assu m p tion  that 
affectiv e  sta tes in fo rm  us about the nature o f th e  situ ation  in w hich  they are 
experienced . T h e  first part o f  th is ch ap ter review s research on  the im pact o f 
a ffectiv e sta tes on evaluative judgm ents, p re sen tin g  evidence that is d ifficu lt to 
reconcile  w ith th e assum p tion  that em otional in fluences on  social ju d gm ent are 
m ediated by selective recall from  m emory. R a th e r , the p resen ted  research  sug­
gests that individuals frequently use th eir a ffectiv e sta te  at the tim e o f judgm ent 
as a p iece o f in fo rm atio n  th a t may bear on th e  jud gm en tal task, according to a 
"H o w  do I feel about it? "  heuristic (Schw arz 8c C lore , 1 9 8 8 ). T h e  second  part o f 
th e  ch ap ter exten d s the inform ative-fu nctions assu m p tio n  to research  on affective 
influences on  decision m aking and pro blem  so lv in g , su ggesting  that affective 
sta tes may in fluen ce the choice o f p ro cessin g  stra teg ies. Sp ecifically , it is argued 
that negative affectiv e  states, w hich inform  the o rg an ism  th at its cu rren t situation 
is p ro b lem atic , fo ster the use o f e ffo rtfu l, d eta il-o rien ted , analytical p rocessing  
strateg ies, w hereas positive affective states fo s te r  th e  use o f less e ffo rtfu l heu ristic 
strateg ies.
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H O W  D O  I FEEL A BO U T IT?: AFFECTIVE STATES 
AND EVALUATIVE JUDGM EN TS
T h a t  ou r m oods m ay stro n g ly  in fluen ce how  we se e  the w orld is a fam iliar 
e x p e rie n ce  to  m ost p erson s. N o t su rprisingly , it has been  co nfirm ed  in a large 
n u m ber o f  ex p e rim en ta l studies. Individuals' a ffective sta tes have been  sh ow n to 
in flu en ce  a w ide range o f  evaluative jud gm ents, ran g in g  from  sa tisfactio n  w ith 
co n su m er goods (Isen , Sh a lk er, C lark, & K arp , 1 978) and the evaluation o f o th er 
p erso n s (C lo re , Schw arz, & K irsch , 1 9 8 3 ), selected  activ ities (C arson Sc Adam s, 
1 9 8 0 ) , o r  p ast life  events (C lark  Sc Teasdale, 1982) to rep orts o f hap p iness and 
sa tisfa ctio n  w ith  o n e ’s life  as a w hole (Sch w arz  Si C lore , 1983).
F ind ings o f  th is type have usually been attributed  to  the im pact o f affective 
sta tes on  the recall o f  valenced m aterial from  m em ory. Sp ecifica lly , m em ory 
research  has d em o nstrated  th a t positively valenced m ateria l is m ore accessible in 
m em ory  w h en  individuals are  in p ositive ra th e r than  in negative m oods, w hereas 
negatively  valenced m ateria l is m ore accessible w hen they are in negative rath er 
than  p o sitiv e  m oods (e .g ., B o w er, 1 9 8 1 ; Isen e t  al., 1 9 7 8 ). T h u s, a p erson  w ho is 
asked to  evaluate a sp e cific  targ et w hile in a good m ood is likely to recall the 
p o sitiv e  asp ects o f  th e  targ et b e fo re  th e  negative on es. Because individuals rarely 
retriev e all the in fo rm a tio n  that is p o ten tia lly  relevant, but rath er tru n cate  the 
search  p rocess as so on  as enough in fo rm ation  has com e to  m ind for them  to form  
a ju d g m en t (see  B od enhau sen  & W yer, 1 987 , and W yer, 1 980 , fo r review s), m ood- 
co n g ru en t recall results in a selectiv e data base. Su bsequ ent evaluations, based on 
th e  recalled  in fo rm a tio n , are  th ere fo re  bound to be m o re  positive  under m ore 
p ositiv e  m oods, because p ositiv e  in form ation  about th e  targ et is ov errep resen ted  
in recall. In  ad dition , the ease w ith w hich that in fo rm ation  cam e to m ind may 
lend it ad ditional w eigh t (T v ersk y  & K ah n em an , 1 9 7 4 ). T h e se  assum p tions 
pred ict m oo d -con gru en t ju d g m en ts to the ex te n t that the ju d g m en t is based on 
m ateria l recalled  from  m em ory.
T h e  sa m e assu m p tions can  be used to account for d ifferences in the evalua­
tio n  o f  p eo p le , ev en ts , and o b je c ts  th a t are new in o n e 's  ex p e rien ce , because m ood 
congru ency  o f recall should  also influence th e  accessibility  o f  relevant in terp retiv e  
co n cep ts. N ew  in fo rm a tio n , how ever, is encoded in te rm s o f the m ost accessible 
ap p licab le  co n cep ts, as has been  found in  a variety o f  studies (e.g ., H igg ins, 
R h o le s , & Jo n e s , 1 9 7 7 ; see H ig g in s , 1989, for a review ). A ccordingly, th e  m ood- 
induced d iffe re n tia l accessibility  o f concep ts should result in m ood -congruent 
en cod in gs o f  new  in fo rm a tio n , a t least if  th e  newly acquired in form ation  is 
su ffic ien tly  am biguous to allow  for d ifferen t in terp re ta tio n s. T h e re fo re , the target 
stim u lu s w ill be consid ered  m o re  favorably under p o sitiv e than  under negative 
m oods. F inally , th e  increased  accessibility  o f m ood -congruent m aterial in m em ory 
m ay lead to  m oo d -con gru en t associations th at may fu rth e r  in flu en ce the evalua­
tio n  o f  th e  targ et (e.g., C lark  & W adell, 1983).
A lth o u gh  th e  described logic o f  m ood -congruent recall seem s to provide a 
p lausib le account for m ood-induced d ifferences in evaluative ju d gm en ts, th e  ac­
cu m u latin g  em p irica l evidence ch allen ges som e o f the assu m p tio n s en ta iled  in
th is po sition . O n th e  on e  hand, m o od -con gru en t'reca ll has been  found to be a 
ra th e r frag ile  p h en o m en on  that is so m etim es d ifficu lt to ob tain  in em pirical 
studies (cf. B laney, 1 9 8 6 ; Bow er & M ayer, 1985). M ost im p o rtantly , m ood- 
congru ent recall is m ost likely to be obtained fo r  se lf-referen ced  m aterial, and it is 
"im p o ssib le  o r d ifficu lt to d em onstrate w hen stim u lu s exp o su re occurs under sets 
that are exp licitly  an tith etica l to se lf-re feren cin g " (B lan ey , 1996 , p. 2 3 2 ). M o re­
ov er, mood congruency may be lim ited to relatively  unstructured m aterial and is 
d ifficu lt to find w hen m aterial is presented  in narrativ e form , such that positive 
and negative e lem e n ts are interconnected  (H a sh e r , R o se , Z acks, S a n ft, & D o ren , 
1985 ; M ecklenbrau ker & H ager, 1984) o r  o th erw ise  w ell organized  (Fietller, 
Pam pe, & S ch erf, 1986). In addition, facilitated  recall o f m ood-incongruent m ate­
rial has been observed  in som e studies (e.g ., Laird, W agener, H ala l, & Szegda, 
1 982 ; Srull, 1 9 8 3 )— a finding that has been attrib uted  to cue overload (W atkins, 
1 9 7 9 ) : In the absence o f  additional recall cues, m ood states may result in a diffused 
retrieval of m ood -congruent in form ation , ren d erin g  m ood -incongruent m aterial 
m ore d istinct. Finally, num erous alternative ex p lan atio n s have been  suggested  to 
account for th e effects  o f  mood congruency, and a good m any inco nsisten t 
findings have been reported  (see Blaney, 1 986 , fo r a review ). O n the o th er hand, 
m ood effects on evaluative judgm ents are ra th e r robust and have frequently  
show n a p attern  that is inconsistent w ith p red ictions generated  by m odels of 
m ood -congruent recall.
A n a ltern ativ e account o f mood e ffects on  evaluative jud gm ents, on e  that 
provides a b e tter fit w ith the available data, has been  suggested  by Schw arz and 
C lore (Sch w arz, 1987, 1988 ; Schw arz Sc C lore , 1983 , 1 9 8 8 ). T h is  account was 
stim u lated  by previous discussions by W yer and C arlsto n  (1 9 7 9 )  and research on 
the m isattrib u tio n  o f  arousal (see Z anna Sc C ooper, 1 9 7 6 ; Z illm a n , 1 9 7 8 ). It 
focuses on th e  in form ativ e function o f a ffectiv e states in co ntrolled  inference 
processes, rath er than  on the autom atic p ro cess o f  m ood -con gruent retrieval.
Sp ecifically , it is suggested that individuals m ay use their perceived affective 
reaction s as relevant in form atio n  w hen m akin g  evaluative jud gm ents. In fact, 
so m e evaluative jud gm ents refer, by d efin ition , to on e 's a ffective reaction  to the 
stim ulus. For exam p le , w hen asked how  "lik e a b le ” M ary is, individuals may 
in terp re t this qu estion  to refer to their feelin gs tow ard M ary. I f  so, they may not 
engage in detailed analyses o f  M ary’s behaviors and tra its , but may assess their 
ow n feelings tow ard M ary and use them  as a basis for jud gm ent. O th er evaluative 
judgm ents may not re fer directly to one's feelin gs about the target, but may pose a 
task that is very com p lex  and dem anding. A g ain , the ju d g m en tal task may be 
sim p lified  by assessing  o n e 's  ow n feelings about the target. R a th e r  than co m p u t­
ing a ju d gm ent on  th e  basis o f recalled featu res o f  the target, individuals may 
th erefo re  ask them selves, "H o w  do 1 feel about it? "  (Schw arz & C lore, 1988). In 
doing so, they may m istake feelin gs due to a p re -ex is tin g  sta te  as a reaction  to the 
target stim ulus, and th is may result in m ore positive evaluations under pleasant 
than  under u n pleasan t moods.
T h is  assum p tio n  g en erates a num ber o f  p red ictions that can no t be derived 
from  the assu m p tio n  that mood effects are m ediated by selective recall o f  m ood-
co n g ru en t in fo rm ation . T h e  firs t , and m ost im p o rtan t, pred iction  is that the 
im p act o f  a ffective sta tes on  evaluative jud gm ents is a function o f th e ir perceived 
in fo rm a tio n a l value. If  individuals attrib ute  their cu rren t feelings to a source that 
is irrelev an t to the evaluation o f  the target stim u lus, the in form ation al value of 
th e ir  affectiv e  s ta te  for evaluating the target should be discredited. I f  so, they 
should co nsid er th e ir feelin gs u n inform ativ e, and th e  feelin g s should not in flu­
en ce  th e ir  ju d g m en ts about th e  target. A ccording to m odels o f  m ood -congru ent 
recall, on  the o th er hand, the im pact o f affective states should depend  only on the 
evaluative in fo rm atio n  retrieved  from  m em ory, ra th e r  than  on in fo rm atio n  p ro ­
vided by the affectiv e  sta te  itself. T h ere fo re , m odels o f m ood -con gruent retrieval 
p red ict th a t m anip u lations o f  th e  in form ational value o f the affectiv e s ta te  itself 
w ill n o t in flu en ce its im pact on  evaluative judgm ents.
A second p red iction  holds that the im pact o f  a ffective sta tes on  evaluative 
jud gm ents should be ind ep endent o f the event th a t induced the affectiv e  sta te  in 
the first place, unless th is event discredits the in form atio n al value o f  one's 
feelin g s for th e  ju d gm en t at hand, as discussed above. In co n trast, th e  m ood- 
congru ent recall hyp othesis pred icts that th e  m ore o th er cond ition s facilitate 
selectiv e recall o f  relevant in fo rm atio n , th e m ore pronounced  m ood e ffec ts  on 
evaluative ju d g m en ts should be. T h u s, mood effects should be m ore pronounced 
w hen p o ten tia lly  biasing m ateria l is activated both  by th e  m ood on e  is in and the 
ev en t that e licited  th is m ood in the first place. F or exam p le, a depressed  m ood 
that is induced throu gh thou ghts about a serious d isease should affect jud gm ents 
about diseases m ore strongly  than  a depressed m ood that is induced by o th er 
th ou g h ts, because negative in fo rm atio n  about d iseases would be activated  by both 
the co n te n t o f  o n e 's  tho ughts and one's depressed  m ood. A ccording to  the 
in fo rm ativ e-fu n ctio n s h y p o thesis , how ever, the n o n em otio n al co n ten t o f  the 
m ood -indu cing  stim u lus should be irrelevant unless it in fluences the ap p aren t 
in fo rm a tio n a l value o f  the accom panying feelin gs. M ood e ffects  on  evaluative 
ju d gm en ts should th e re fo re  g en eralize  over a w ide range o f  ju d gm en ts, in d ep en ­
dently o f w h eth er the thou gh t co n ten t associated w ith th at m ood does o r does not 
bear on  the jud gm ent.
F inally, m odels o f  m ood -congruent recall hold that m ood e ffec ts  on evalua­
tive jud gm en ts should  be m ore pronounced w hen th e m ood at th e  tim e o f 
ju d g m en t m atches th e m ood o n e  was in w hen on e  orig in ally  acquired the relevant 
in form atio n . T h is  p red iction  derives from  the find ing  th a t recall is facilitated  by 
m atch ing  m ood sta tes at the tim e o f encoding and at the tim e  o f  retrieval, 
accord ing to  the p rin cip les o f  sta te-d ep en d en t learn in g  (B o w er, 1981 ). By co n ­
tra st, th e  hyp o thesis that affectiv e  states serv e  in fo rm ativ e  fun ctio ns does not 
m ake th is  pred iction . I f  individuals consult their feelin g s as a source o f  in fo rm a ­
tio n , the effects o f the m ood should occur at th e  tim e  o f  ju d g m en t, irresp ective of 
the m ood at the tim e o f  encoding.
T h e  available em p irica l evidence favors the in fo rm ativ e-fu n ctio n s hypothesis 
o v er th e  m ood -con gru en t recall hypothesis w ith  regard  to  all th ree p red ictions, as 
review ed below .
The Informational Value of Moods and the Implications of M emories: 
(Mis)Atlribution Studies
if individuals use th e ir  affective sta te  at the tim e o f ju d gm ent as in form atio n , the 
im pact o f  feelings on judgm ents should depend on  th e ir  perceived in form ational 
value. Feelings that are attributed  to a source that is irrelevan t to the judgm ent at 
hand should not be considered inform ative; they should th ere fo re  be disregarded 
and should have no effec t.
T h e  evidence bearing  m ost clearly on  th is  hyp othesis com es from  research 
on the im p act o f m oods on judgm ents o f  su b jectiv e  w ell-b ein g — that is, judg­
m ents o f  hap p iness and satisfaction  w ith o n e 's  life  as a w hole (see  Schw arz, 1987, 
and Schw arz & S track , in press, for detailed  d iscussions). In  genera l, respondents 
rep ort being hap p ier and m ore satisfied  w ith th e ir  life  as a w hole w hen they are 
in an elated ra th er than  in a depressed m ood. For exam p le, su b jects w ho found a 
d im e on  a copy m achine (Schw arz, 1 9 8 3 ), o r  w ho w ere interview ed on sunny days 
(Schw arz Sc C lore, 1983, E xp erim ent 2 ) , rep orted  h ig h er w ell-being  than  subjects 
w ho did not find a d im e o r subjects w ho w ere interview ed on rainy days.
D ifferen t th eo retica l m odels may account for th ese  findings. F rom  the 
p erspective o f m ood-congruent recall, subjects in good m oods may have recalled 
m ore positive in fo rm atio n  about their lives, as has been  rep orted  by Bow er and 
G illigan  (cited  in B ow er, 1981 ; see also C lark Sc Teasdale, 1 982 ; D ien er, L arson, & 
E m m on s, 1 9 8 4 ). If  so, the m ore positive evaluations may have resulted from  
selective recall of m ore positive m em ories. A ltern ativ e ly , su b jects may have used 
th eir feelin gs at th e  tim e o f judgm ent as heuristically  relevant in form ation . Facing 
the com p lex  task of evaluating one's " life  as a w h o le ," for w hich too m any facts 
are poten tially  relevant and for w hich ju d g m en tal criteria  are ill defined, one may 
sim ply consid er the target ( " life  as a w hole”) for a m om en t, using any affective 
reactions that result as a guide to an evaluation. W h e n  one is using feelings as 
in form ation  in th is way, how ever, it is no t g enera lly  p o ssib le  to sep arate  the 
feelin gs due to the ob ject o f ju d gm ent from  th o se  due to o n e 's  background mood 
state. A ccordingly, feelings that w ere elicited  by th e  exp e rim en ta l m anipulations 
may be in terp reted  by subjects to reflect th e ir  reaction s to th e targ et, resulting  in 
m ood-congruent jud gm ents that w ere not m ediated  by m ood -congruent recall.
To test these  altern ativ e hypotheses, th e  perceived in fo rm ation al value of 
su bjects' a ffectiv e state was m anipulated in various studies (Sch w arz  & Clore, 
1983 ; Schw arz, Servay, & K u m p f, 1 9 8 5 ). F o r exam p le , in the w eath er study 
m entioned  above (Schw arz & C lore, 1983 , E x p e rim e n t 2 ) , so m e su b jects w ere 
induced to a ttrib u te  th e ir  cu rrent moods to a tran sien t ex tern a l source that was 
irrelevant to the evaluation o f  th e ir lives. T h is  w as accom plished  by d irectin g  their 
a tten tio n  to the w eather. In one~condition, th e  in terv iew ers— w ho co llected  the 
data on the te le p h o n e — pretended to call from  out o f  tow n and asked at 
the begin n ing  o f the co nversatio n , "B y  th e way, how ’s the w eath er down th e re ?"  
T h e  idea was that in the process of answ ering the q u estion  (e.g ., " I t 's  te rrib le " or 
" I t 's  very p le a sa n t") , respondents would link th e ir  m om entary  feelings to the
w eath er, w ith  th e  result that they would not la ter see  th e ir  feelin gs as a reaction 
to the process o f  considering  th e  quality o f  th e ir  lives.
A s predicted by the fee lin g s-as-in fo rm atio n  h y p o thesis , subjects w ho w ere 
called o n  rainy days and w ere induced to a ttr ib u te  th e ir  bad m ood to  the w eather 
rep orted  being as happy and satisfied  w ith th e ir  lives as su b jects w ho were called 
on su nny days. W h en  the w eath er was n ot m entioned , how ever, low er global 
w ell-bein g  was rep orted  on rainy than  on  sunny days. In o th e r  w ords, subjects 
w ho fe lt  bad but attributed  th e ir  m om entary  feelin gs to  a tran sien t, irrelevant 
so urce— nam ely, the w eath er— discounted th e ir  cu rren t affective sta te  in evaluat­
ing the quality o f th e ir  lives as a w hole. Su b jects w ho w ere called on sunny days 
and w ho w ere in a good m ood, on  the o th er hand, w ere not influenced by (he 
situ ation al exp lan atio n  offered  to th em . T h is  asym m etry  is presum ably due to the 
fact that positive  affective states require less exp lan atio n  than negative on es, as I 
e lab o ra te  in m ore d etail in  the second part o f  this ch ap ter. If  no exp lan atio n  for 
on e 's p o sitiv e feelin gs is sought to begin w ith , how ever, d irectin g  su bjects' 
a tte n tio n  to a plausible source o f  th e ir  good m ood is unlikely to show  any effect.
W ith  regard to the co m p etin g  th eo retica l m odels, the d iscou nting  effect 
(K e lle y , 1 9 7 2 ) observed under bad-m ood cond ition s clearly  su p p orts the h y p o th e­
sis th a t affective sta tes may serve in form ative fu n ctio ns: Facing  th e  co m p lex  task 
o f  evalu ating  his o r her life  as a w hole, a p erson  m ay use w hatever feelin gs are 
en cou n tered  at the tim e o f  ju d g m en t as an ind ication  o f  his o r h e r reaction  to the 
qu estion . T h is  should not hap p en, how ever, w hen  the in fo rm atio n a l value o f  the 
m om en tary  feelings is called in to  question . A ccordingly, a m easure o f su bjects' 
cu rren t m ood, ad m inistered  at th e  end o f the interview , was m ore strongly  
co rrelated  w ith  rep orted  w ell-bein g  w hen the w eath er was not m entioned  than 
w hen it w as m entioned . T h e  valence and in ten sity  o f su b jects ' cu rren t m ood itself, 
how ever, was not affected  by d irectin g  su b jects ’ a tte n tio n  to th e  w eath er; th is 
suggests th a t the a ttrib u tion al m anip u lation  did n ot in fluence resp on d en ts ' cu r­
ren t m ood itse lf, but only th eir in feren ces based on it.
T h e s e  findings are inco m p atib le  w irh pred ictio ns that can  be derived from  
m odels o f  m ood -congru ent recall. A ccording to these m odels, su b jects w ho w ere 
interview ed on  sunny days should have recalled m ore p o sitiv e  aspects o f  th e ir  lives 
than  su b jects w ho w ere interview ed on  rainy days. N o te , how ever, that a ttrib u ting  
on e 's  cu rre n t feelings to the w eath er should not a ffect the evaluative im p lications 
o f  the recalled  in fo rm ation . R a th e r, it should only lim it the ran g e o f issues about 
w hich th e  feelin gs seem  in form ativ e. A ccordingly, m odels o f  m ood -congrucnt 
recall w ould predict a m ain e ffect o f su b jects' affectiv e  s ta te , ra th e r than  the 
observed in teractio n  o f su b jects’ mood and th e  source to w hich  it was attributed. 
T h e r e fo re , th e  obtained  findings ren der it unlikely  that the im pact o f m ood on 
rep orted  w ell-bein g  was m ediated by selective recall o f  m ood -congruent in fo rm a ­
tion , as retrieved  m odels o f  a ffect and co gn ition  would Suggest.
T h is  p o in t is fu rth er su pported  by a study in w hich m oods w ere induced by 
having each su b ject vividly recall and describe e ith e r a po sitive o r a negative life 
event (Sch w arz  & C lo re , 1 983 , E x p e rim e n t 1). G enerally , su b jects w ho had to 
d escrib e negative life  events rep orted  low er h ap p in ess and sa tisfactio n  w ith their
lives as a w hole chan su b jects w ho described p ositive events. A gain , how ever, this 
d ifference was w ashed out w hen su bjects w ho described n egative events had a 
chance to m isactribute the resulting  negative mood to a tran sien t extern al 
sou rce— nam ely , features o f  the soundproof e x p e rim en ta l room  they w ere in. 
U nder that cond ition , they reported  being as satisfied  as su b jects who had not 
described negative events, T h is  finding suggests th a t subjects did not base their 
evaluations o f their lives on a review o f life events, d esp ite the fact that the mood 
m anipulation  had rendered a negative event highly  salient. R a th e r , the effect 
seem s to have depended on  the in form ational im p lication s o f subjects' cu rrent 
affective sta tes. In  line w ith this assum ption, a m easure o f su b jects' current mood 
was again m ore strongly  correlated  w ith m easures o f gen eral life  satisfactio n  
w hen th e ir  a tten tio n  was not directed ro the ex p e rim en ta l room  as a possible 
source o f th e ir cu rren t feelings than w hen it was.
In su m m ary, these studies suggest that individuals evaluate th eir global w ell­
being on the basis o f their m ood at the tim e o f ju d g m en t, unless the in form ational 
value o f  th e ir  cu rren t feelings for that purpose has been called into question. T h a t 
the im pact o f  m ood did depend on its perceived in form ation al value, as is 
reflected  in the observed discounting effects, is in co m p atib le  w ith models o f 
m ood -congruent recall, w hich hold that the ju d gm en t is a fun ction o f the evalua­
tive im p lications o f the recalled (m ood -congru ent) in fo rm atio n . T h e  im plications 
of any m em o ries that may have com e to m ind, how ever, should not have been 
affected  by th e  source to w hich subjects a ttrib uted  th eir cu rren t feelings. O b ­
viously, this does not im ply that m ood -congruent recall may not have occurred. 
G iven that recall data w ere not assessed, this issue can n ot be addressed. T h e  
pattern  of results renders it unlikely, how ever, th a t su bjects used w hatever they 
may have recalled  as a basis of judgm ent; th is parallels o th er research chat 
suggests a relative independence o f m em ory and ju d gm en t (cf. Fiske, K enny, & 
Taylor, 198 2 ; H a stie  & Park, 1986). T h is  issue is addressed in m ore detail in  a 
subsequent section  o f this chapter.
Mood and Though! Content: Generalizing Affective Influences
A ccording to m odels o f  m ood -con gm en t recall, m ood is ju st on e  o f a m ultitude o f 
variables that a ffects w hich in form atio n  is retrieved, and the key variable in mood 
effects on ju d gm ent is the content o f the retrieved  in fo rm ation . Accordingly, 
mood e ffec ts  on evaluative judgm ents should be m o st pronounced w hen the mood 
is induced by thou ghts that are relevant to the ju d gm en t, because both the co n ten t 
o f  the m ood induction and the mood itse lf should co n trib u te  to an increased 
accessibility  o f relevant m aterial in m em ory. Several studies, how ever, have failed 
to co n firm  th is prediccion.
For exam p le , in a study by Jo h n so n  and T versky  (1 9 8 3 ) , su b jects read rep orts 
of negative even ts (e.g ., descrip tions o f  a case o f  can cer), w hich presum ably 
induced a depressed  and slightly  anxious m ood. Su bsequ ently, they evaluated a 
large nu m ber o f risks as m ore th reaten in g  than  did su bjects in a good mood. T h e  
im pact o f  su b jects ' m ood, how ever, was independent o f  the ob jecc o f judgm ent or
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the co n ten t by w hich it was induced. R ead in g  about cancer, for exam p le, had 
equally stro n g  e ffec ts  on jud gm ents o f  the risk o f  can cer and on jud gm ents o f  the 
risk o f accidents and divorce. T h is  g en era liza tion  o f  e ffec ts  ov er d issim ilar co nten t 
d om ain s is in co m p atib le  w ith  e x istin g  m odels o f  m ood -con gruent recall, but does 
co n fo rm  w ell w ith p red ictions derived from  th e  fee lin g s-a s-in fo rm a tio n  h yp o the­
sis.
A ccording to th is hyp oth esis, individuals w ho face the d ifficu lt task o f 
evaluating unknow n risks may Cope w ith  the ju d gm ental task by consu lting  their 
cu rren t feelin gs. If  they feel depressed  and anxious, they may conclude that the 
risk  they are asked to evaluate is indeed d ep ressing  and th rea ten in g , and may then 
evaluate it as being  m ore severe than  they would under a m ore elated  m ood. N o te 
that th is assu m p tion  predicts that the im pact o f  the a ffective s ta te  should be the 
sam e for all jud gm en ts to w hich the sta te  is relevan t, regardless o f the co n ten t by 
w hich th e  m ood was induced. M ood e ffec ts  should only be absent w hen su bjects 
a ttr ib u te  th e ir  feelings to th e  story they read, w hich discredits the feelin gs' 
g en eral in form atio n al value, as discussed in th e  co n tex t o f  the m isattribu tion  
studies rep orted  earlier.
S im ila r  co n te n t-fre e  g en era liza tio n s o f  m ood e ffec ts  w ere observed in a study 
(C lore  et al., 1 983) that induced p o sitiv e o r negative m oods through guided 
fanrasies e ith e r  about a p leasan t o r an u npleasant date (an  in terp erso n al them e) 
o r about a p leasan t o r an u n p leasan t vacation (a n o n in terp erso n a l them e). 
Su bsequ ently , su b jects read am biguous passages e ith e r about an o th er p erson  
( in terp erso n a l th e m e ) o r  about a vacation (n o n in te rp e rso n a l th em e), m odeled 
a fte r  m aterials used by H ig g in s e t  al. (1 9 7 7 ) . It was hypothesized  that if mood 
sta tes in crease th e  accessibility  o f  m ood -congru ent concep ts, am biguously de­
scribed  stim u li should be encoded in m ore  p o sitive term s in good m oods than  in 
bad m oods. M oreov er, it was tho ught th a t this e ffec t should be m ore pronounced 
w hen the no n em o tio n a! co gn itiv e co n ten t o f  th e  m ood-inducing fantasy was 
relevant to  the am biguous d escrip tion  than  w hen it was not. A ccordingly, m odels 
o f  m ood -con gru en t encod ing and recall would pred ict additive e ffects  o f the 
quality o f  the m ood and the th em a tic  sim ilarity  o f  th e  fantasy and the am biguous 
passage.
Su ch additive e ffec ts , how ever, w ere not obtain ed . R a th e r , su b jects  evaluated 
both the p erson  and the vacation reso rt m o re  positively  w hen they w ere in a good 
ra th e r than  a bad m ood, regardless o f  the co n ten t o f  the fantasy through w hich 
th e ir  m ood was induced. T h u s, th e ir  evaluations reflected  only th e ir  m ood at the 
t im e o f ju d g m en t, as predicted by the hyp othesis that feelin gs serve in form ative 
fu n ctions.
M ood at Encoding and M ood at Judgm ent: What's Crucial?
Follow ing  the rules o f sta te-d ep en d en t learn in g , m ood -con gru en t recall has been 
found to be m ost pronounced w hen th e  m ood at en cod ing m atch es the m ood at 
retrieval (B o w er, 1981). If  m ood e ffects  on evaluative ju d g m en ts are  m ediated by
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m ood -congru ent recall, they should show  the sam e p a tte rn . ï f  evaluative judg­
m ents are based on the im plications o f the m ood state  itself, how ever, rather than 
on the im p lications o f any inform ation  that may be recalled from  m em ory, mood 
effects on  jud gm ent should only be a function o f the m ood at th e  tim e of 
ju d gm ent, and the encoding mood should p rove largely irrelevant.
In a study that addressed th is issue (C lore , P arro tt, & W ilk in , 198 9 ; Schw arz 
& C lore, 1 9 8 6 ), p o sitive or negative m oods w ere induced through vivid recall of a 
p ositive or a negative life  event under hypnosis. Su bsequently, subjects read an 
am biguous p erson  d escrip tion and rep orted , in a forced-choice form at, which 
traits o f  four p airs o f traits best characterized  the stim ulus person . N o t su rp ris­
ingly, subjects in a negative mood chose m ore negative traits than subjects in a 
p ositive mood.
Follow ing this first judgm ent, su bjects w ere again hypnotized  and put into a 
good o r bad mood through the recall o f  a n o th er life  even t; th is resulted in a design 
that crossed m ood at the tim e of encoding (and first ju d gm en t) w ith mood at the 
tim e o f retrieval (and second ju d gm en t). A fte r co m p letio n  o f  the second mood 
induction, su b jects  reported  how well each o f the traits presented  earlier described 
the stim ulus person .
A ccording to m odels o f m ood-congruent recall, th e  in fo rm atio n  that subjects 
retrieve from  m em ory should reflect their m ood at the tim e o f  encoding. T h is 
should have been  particularly  likely in the p resen t study, because su bjects had 
already provided a first judgm ent at the tim e o f encod in g. M oreover, selective 
recall should be enhanced if the retrieval m ood m atches the encod ing mood. In 
con trast to these  pred ictions, how ever, the second jud gm en t show ed no im pact of 
encoding m ood w hatsoever. R a th er, it reflected  only su b jects' m ood at the tim e o f 
the second jud gm ent, w ith subjects in a good m ood evaluating the target person 
m ore positively  than su bjects in a bad m ood. T h u s, both ju d gm ents at T im e 1 and 
jud gm ents at T im e  2 w ere solely a function o f th e  mood the su b jects w ere in at the 
tim e the resp ectiv e judgm ents w ere made.
In  co m b in atio n  w ith the previous findings, these results suggest that subjects 
did not en gage in a detailed analysis o f  th e  evaluative im p lications o f each piece o f  
in form atio n  presented  about the target. R a th e r, they sim p lified  the judgm ental 
task by co n su ltin g  their current feelings to d eterm in e  w hether the target person 
was likeable o r not. C onsisten t w ith th is conclu sio n , F iedler e t  al. (1 9 8 6 )  found 
pronounced e ffects  of mood on jud gm ents o f  lik ing, w ithout any evidence for 
m ood -congru ent retrieval o f  in form ation  about the stim u lus p erson , in their recall 
data.
Global Moods and Specific Emotions: Som e Important Differences
A lthough the studies reviewed above d em o n strate  that g lobal m ood states serve 
inform ative fun ctions, it is assum ed that the sam e logic holds for specific em o ­
tions. H ow ever, som e im p ortant qu alifications may apply, as is suggested by a 
consid eratio n  of the ch aracteristics o f g lobal m oods and sp ecific  em otions.
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The Informational Value of Moods and Emotions
A cen tra l ch a ra c te ris tic  o f  m ood stares is th e ir  d iffuse and unfocused quality 
(cf. C lore, 198 5 ; E w ert, 1 9 8 3 ) , w hich  se ts  them  ap art from  specific em otio n s. In 
co n tra st to  m oods, em o tio n s  are  sp ecific  reactions to p articu lar events. M ost 
im p o rtan tly , they have an id en tifiab le  cause, a sh arp  rise tim e, and a relatively 
sh o rt d uration . M oods, on  th e  o th er hand, may result from  a series o f  m ildly 
p leasan t o r u n p leasan t even ts, n o ne o f  w hich needs to be su fficiently  in ten se  to 
produce an e m o tio n  by itse lf, but w hich co llectively  leave one in a generalized  
po sitive  o r n egativ e fee lin g  sta te . M oods, th erefo re , do not always have easily 
id en tifiab le  causes. T h ey  may co m e about gradually, and they tend to last longer 
than  em otio ns- M o reo v er, a m ood m ay develop as the residue o f a sp ecific 
em o tio n , on ce the em o tio n 's  in tensity  d issipates and its cause is no longer in the 
focus o f a tten tio n  (B o lln o w , 1 9 5 6 ), T h u s, the cause o f a mood tends to be m ore 
rem o te  in tim e th an  the cause o f  an em o tio n  and tends to  be less clearly defined 
fo r the exp e rien cer . T h e s e  ch a ra cteristics  are  reflected  in ou r use o f language that 
im p lies sp ecific  re feren ces for em o tio n s , but not for global m oods. T h u s, we say 
th at we are afraid " o f  so m e th in g  and angry "a b o u t" so m eth in g , but that we are 
" in "  a happy o r sad m ood.
It  is th is u n d ifferen tia ted  and unfocused nature o f m ood sta tes that renders 
th e m  in form ativ e  fo r a wide variety  o f d ifferen t ju d gm ents. In fact, w hen su b jects 
are  induced to a ttr ib u te  th e ir  m oods to sp ecific  causes— as in the w eath er e x p e ri­
m en t, described above (Sch w arz  Si C lore, 1 9 8 3 )— the im pact o f m ood on  ju d g­
m en ts th a t are  unrelated  to th a t source vanishes. T h e s e  co nsid erations suggest 
th a t th e  in fo rm a tio n a l value o f sp e cific  em otions is m ore restricted  than  the 
in fo rm a tio n a l value o f  g lobal m oods (C lore , 1 9 8 5 ). G iven that th e  source o f an 
e m o tio n  is m ore likely to be in  the focus o f a tten tio n , on e 's em otion al feelin gs 
m ay be m ore likely to be a ttribu ted  (correctly ) to  a sp ecific  event. T h is  should 
reduce th e ir  p o ten tia lly  b iasin g  ro le in ju d gm ents that are unrelated  to th is  event.
T h is  hypothesis is nicely supported  by a study by K e ltn e r  and Audrain (1 9 8 8 , 
E x p e rim e n t 2 ) . Follow ing  our research  (Schw arz & C lore, 1983), these authors 
induced a sad m ood by having su b jects vividly recall a negative life event. Su bse­
quently , som e su b jects w ere asked to  describe "w h at em otio n s" they currently felt, 
w hereas o th ers indicated w h ere  and w hen th e negative event had taken place. 
C om p ared  to the la tter group, those su bjects w ho had to label their cu rrent feelings 
w ith  sp ecific  em otio n  term s w ere  considerably less affected by the m ood m anipula­
tio n  and rep orted  significantly  h ig h er life  satisfactio n , despite being in a depressed 
m ood. In  a related study (K e ltn e r  & Audrain, 1988, E xp erim ent 1), describing 
on e 's  cu rrent em otio n s was at least as effectiv e in reducing the im pact o f a sadness- 
inducing hypothetical event as was m isattrtbu tin g  on e's sad feelings to the e x p e ri­
m enta l room . In co m b in atio n , these studies suggest that labeling their current 
feelin gs w ith sp ecific  em otio n  term s induced subjects to identify sp ecific causes for 
th e ir  cu rrent feelin g s, thus ren d erin g  the feelings u ninform ative for subsequent 
evaluative jud gm ents that did not p ertain  to these sp ecific causes.
A particularly  in teres tin g  im p lication  o f this analysis is that sp ecific  em o ­
tio n s may be unlikely to a ffect unrelated  ju d gm ents sh ortly  a fter their o n se t, w hen
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th e  event that elicited  them  is still salient. R a th e r , th e ir  m ore g en eral im pact may 
be exp ected  a fter the em otio n  d issipates, leaving th e  individual in a d iffuse mood, 
as described by Bolln ow  (1 9 5 6 ). T h is  possibility  awaits fu rth er research . N o te , 
how ever, that these  consid erations do not im ply that sp ecific em o tio n s would not 
serve in fo rm ativ e  fu n ctions; they only em p hasize that th e ir in form ation a l value is 
likely to  be m ore restricted .
Misattributing Fear
T h a t  sp ecific  em otion s do affect judgm ents to  w hich they are relevant has, in 
fact, received em p irica l support. For exam p le, in  a study on the m isattrtb u n o n  o f 
fear (Sch w arz et al., 1985), heavy sm okers w ere exposed  to a fear-arou sing  m ovie 
that vividly portrayed the negative side e ffects  o f sm oking. R ela tiv e  to a co ntrol 
group that was not exposed to the m ovie, su b jects w ho saw the m ovie rep orted  a 
s tro n g er in ten tio n  to cut down on the nu m ber o f  c ig arettes they sm oked. T h is  
in ten tio n  was less pronounced, however, w hen su b jects could m isattribu te  their 
affective reaction s to a placebo pill that was said to have aro usin g  side effects. 
Su b jects w ho w ere inform ed that the p ill had tranquilizing  side e ffects , on the 
o th er hand, rep orted  a stron ger in tention  to reduce sm oking  than  su bjects w ho 
did not exp ect side e ffects  o f the pill. In  addition, daily se lf-rep o rts  o f the num ber 
of c ig arettes  sm oked ov er a 2-w eek period fo llow in g  the e x p e rim en t still showed 
a s ig n ifican t im pact o f the m isattribu tion  m anip ulation .
T h e s e  d iscou nting  and augm entation e ffec ts  (see K elley , 1 9 7 2 ) suggest thar 
su bjects used th eir affective reactions to  the m ovie as a basis for evaluating the 
described risk , resulting  in the p ercep tio n  o f  th e  h igh est risk  w hen they e x p e ­
rienced arousal "d e sp ite "  being tranquilized, and in the p ercep tio n  o f  the low est 
risk w hen they could attribu te  their arousal to th e  pill.
N o te , how ever, that the induced fear was relevant to the ju d gm ental task —  
nam ely, evaluating the risks involved in heavy sm oking. T h a t  is, fear is an 
a ffective reaction  that carries w ith it in fo rm ation  about the d egree o f perceived 
risk  (O rton y , C lore, & C ollins, 1988). A ccordingly, ju d gm en ts o f  risk should be 
influenced w hen made in the presence o f fearfu l feelin gs, as the study o f  sm okers 
indicated . For o th er jud gm ents, how ever, feelin gs o f  fear m ay n ot be considered 
in form ativ e.
T h is  assum p tion  is supported  by research  on  th e  d ifferen tia l im pact o f fear 
and anger (G allag h er & C lore, 1985). W h ereas fear carries in fo rm atio n  about risk, 
anger involves in part d isapproving o f so m eo n e else 's b lam ew orthy action (O r­
tony et al., 1 9 8 8 ). In  lin e w ith this reason in g, G allag h er and C lore (1 9 8 5 )  found 
that hypnotically  induced feelings o f  fear a ffected  jud gm ents o f risk but not o f  
b lam e, w hereas feelin gs o f anger affected  ju d gm en ts o f  b lam e but n o t o f  risk. 
T h u s, the induced em otions influenced evaluative jud gm en ts relevant to th at 
sp ecific  em o tio n , but not evaluative ju d gm ents in dom ains relevant to a d ifferen t 
em o tio n .
In  co m b in atio n , the findings reviewed in th is section  suggest that the im pact 
o f  sp e cific  em o tio n s is m ore lim ited than the im pact o f g lobal m oods. F irst,
em o tio n s usually have a c lear re feren t, thus ren d erin g  them  u n in fo rm ativ e  for 
ju d gm en ts th at do not p erta in  to this re feren t, as is suggested by the K e ltn e r  and 
A udrain (1 9 8 8 )  findings. Secon d , sp ecific  em otio n s provide sp ecific  types of 
in fo rm a tio n  (e .g ., in fo rm a tio n  bearing  on  risk  o r b lam ew orth in ess), thus ren der­
ing them  u n in fo rm ativ e  for jud gm ents th at p ertain  to  a d ifferen t d im ensio n . If a 
sp ecific  em o tio n  is used as the basis for jud gm ent, how ever, its im pact follow s the 
logic o f  d iscou ntin g  and au g m entatio n , as has been show n for global m oods.
W hen Are Judgments Based on O ne's Affective State Rather 
than on Other Information?
N ow  th at co nsid erable  evidence has been reviewed for the in form ativ e functions 
o f  a ffectiv e sta tes , th is q u estion  arises: U n d er w hich conditions are individuals' 
likely to use the in fo rm a tio n  that th eir feelings provide? T h a t  is, w hen do 
individuals follow  a "H o w  do I feel about it? ” heuristic, and w hen are they likely 
to en gag e in m ore e ffo rtfu l, retrieval-based  strateg ies?
T h a t  individuals base evaluative jud gm ents on the in form ation  provided by 
th e ir  feelin gs seem s particu larly  likely under the fo llow ing four co nd ition s: (1 )  
w hen the jud gm en t at hand is affective in nature (e.g ., lik ing for a n o th e r p erson ); 
(2 )  w hen litt le  o th er in fo rm a tio n  is available; (3 )  w hen the ju d gm en t is overly 
co m p lex , and cu m b erso m e to  m ake on the basis o f  a p iecem eal in form ation - 
p ro cessin g  stra teg y ; and (4 )  w hen tim e co n stra in ts or co m p etin g  task dem ands 
lim it th e  cogn itive capacity th a t may be devoted to  form ing  a ju d gm ent. W hereas 
th e  first tw o variables p e rta in  to the availability o f com p eting  in fo rm atio n , the 
la tter tw o p erta in  to p ro cessin g  load. Each o f these  asp ects is discussed in turn 
b e fore th e ir  im p lication s fo r retrieval-based  m odels o f  jud gm ent are assessed.
Availability of Competing Information
A ju d g m en t th a t re fers  explicitly  to  how  on e feels about the o b ject o f 
ju d g m en t ren ders o n e ’s fee lin g s highly relevant. A ccordingly, it is no t su rp risin g  
th at ju d g m en ts o f lik ing  and p re fere n ce  have been found to be stro ngly  influenced 
by resp on d en ts ' feelings (cf. C lore  & Byrne, 1974 ; Z a jo n c , 1 9 8 0 ). M o reov er, o n e ’s 
fee lin g s are so m etim es th e on ly  source o f in fo rm atio n  that m ay be available to 
assist in form ing  a p articu lar jud gm ent. Su ppose, for exam p le, th at subjecrs in an 
e x p e rim e n t are  asked to evaluate w hether an unknow n C h in ese ideograph m eans 
so m eth in g  good or so m e th in g  bad. G iven the absence o f any useful know ledge 
about th e  ideograph, su b jects may be likely to turn to  th e ir  a ffectiv e response, 
asking them selves, "H o w  do I feel about it?'* I f  they en cou nter p ositive feelings, 
they may conclude th at the ideograph may m ean so m eth in g  p o sitive, un less they 
have reason to doubt the in fo rm ation a l value o f  th e ir  feelings.
In  lin e  w ith th is reaso n in g , Z a jo n c  (1 9 8 9 )  found th at su bjects attributed  a 
m ore p ositive  m eaning  to  C h in ese  ideographs w hen the ideographs w ere p re ­
ceded by sm ilin g  ra th e r th an  by frow n in g faces, w hich presum ably elicited  p o si­
tive o r  negative affective reaction s. H ow ever, this e ffec t was only obtained  w hen 
su b jects ’ exp o su re to th e  sm ilin g  o r  frow n in g  faces was su blim in al, thus ensuring
that subjects w ere unaw are o f the source o f th e ir  a ffectiv e reaction . U nd er 
su p ralim in al exp osu re cond itions, subjects apparently  a ttrib u ted  th eir affective 
reaction  correctly  to the facial stim u li, thus rendering it u n in form ativ e fo r evaluat­
ing the C h in ese ideographs. T h is  finding clearly  coincides w ith o th er research 
review ed in th e p resent chapter, in illustrating  th at ju d gm en ts may be based on 
individuals’ affective sta tes rather than  on any sp ecific  featu res o f  the to-be- 
evaluated stim u lus. T h is  finding does not im ply, how ever, th at “p re feren ces need 
no in feren ces,"  as the su btitle  of Z a jo n c 's  (1 9 8 0 )  pap er suggested. As the preced­
ing se ttio n s o f this ch ap ter have indicated, consu lting  o n e ’s affective state and 
d eterm in in g  its in form ational value for the ju d gm en t at hand are highly in feren ­
tial strateg ies, w hich may result in augm entation  and d iscou nting effects as 
described by th e  m ost "reason ed " m odels in so cia l-co gn itiv e research , although 
these in feren tia l steps may not necessarily be accessible to in trosp ection  (see 
N isb ett A: W ilson , 1987).
In sum m ary, o n e ’s apparent affective reaction  to the o b je ct o f judgm ent may 
be the m ost relevant in form ation  in m aking certa in  ju d gm en ts, e ith er because the 
judgm ent refers to on e 's  feelings or because on e 's  feelin gs are the only in form a­
tion available.
T h e  la tter argu m ent also suggests that th e  im pact o f  individuals' affective 
sta te  decreases as the accessibility o f co m p etin g  in fo rm atio n  increases. T h e  
available evidence is in line w ith this assum ption. F or exam p le , Sru ll (1 9 8 3 , 1984) 
reported  th at su b jects ' mood influenced their evaluations o f u n fam iliar, but not o f 
fam iliar products. M oreover, the im pact o f th e  in fo rm a tio n  provided by one's 
m ood may be a function o f the relative salience o f  o n e ’s m ood and o f  com p eting  
in form ation . A ccordingly, we (Strack , Schw arz, &  G sch neid in g er, 1985 , E x p e ri­
m ents 2 and 3 ) observed that subjects who provided sh o rt, n o n em otion al rep orts 
o f  a past life event used this event as a standard o f  co m p ariso n , resulting  in 
co n trast e ffe c ts  on jud gm ents o f cu rrent life  sa tisfactio n . Su b jects w ho had to 
rep ort a past life event in an em otionally  involving style, on the o th er hand, relied 
on the elicited  m ood state in evaluating th eir cu rren t life sa tisfa ctio n , resulting  in 
assim ilation  effects . T h is  pattern  o f findings has been rep licated  in the area of 
re la tion sh ip  sa tisfactio n  (C ollins & C lark, 1 9 8 9 ). In  co m b in atio n , th ese findings 
suggest that o th e r  sources o f  inform ation  may be ignored in the p resence o f a 
sa lien t m ood state.
Processing Load
A lth ough the discussion above suggests th at individuals may consult th e ir 
feelings because o f  a lack o f o th er relevant in form ation , they may also do so 
because too m uch in form ation  is available. In  that case, asking  o n ese lf how on e 
feels about the ob ject o f  judgm ent may provide an e ffic ie n t heu ristic  that greatly  
sim p lifies the jud gm ental task and lim its the dem ands on  co gn itive capacity.
In line w ith th is assum ption, we (Schw arz, Strack , K o m m e r, & W agner, 
1987 , E x p erim en t 1) found pronounced m ood effects  (as a function of the 
ou tcom e o f gam es o f the W est G erm an  nation al soccer team ) on  judgm ents o f 
general life sa tisfactio n , but not on ju d gm ents o f sa tisfactio n  w ith  sp ecific  life
d om ain s, such as on e's incom e. T h is  is p resum ably  due to the facts th a t evaluative 
crite ria  fo r sp ecific  life  dom ains are  w ell defined  and that co m p ariso n  in form ation  
is easily  available, w hereas the evaluation o f  on e 's life  as a w hole requires a 
m u ltitu d e o f  com p arison s along m any d im ensio ns w ith  ill-defin ed  crite ria  (cf. 
Schw arz  & Stra ck , in  p ress). T h u s, the m ore com p lex  th e  ju d gm en tal task was, the 
m ore likely su b jects w ere to  rely on  their feelin gs a t the rim e o f jud gm en t.
In  a related  study, inducing a good or bad m ood by testin g  su b jects in  a 
p leasan t o r an un pleasant room  (Sch w arz e t  al., 1 987 , E x p e rim e n t 2 )  resulted in 
m ood effects on  judgm ents o f general life  satisfactio n , but in co n trast e ffec ts  on 
ju d g m en ts o f housing satisfactio n . T h is  su ggests that su b jects evaluated th e ir  lives 
as a w hole on  th e  basis o f th e ir  m ood (resu ltin g  in  low er  life  sa tisfactio n  in the 
u n p leasan t than  in th e  p leasant ro o m ), but evaluated th e ir  housing sa tisfactio n  on 
th e  basis o f  sa lien t co m p ariso n  in form ation  provided by the room  (resu ltin g  in 
h ig h er  housing  satisfaction  in the unpleasan t than  in the p leasan t ro o m ). Again, 
th is  finding ind icates that re liance on  o n e 's  a ffectiv e sta te  may in crease with 
in creasin g  com p lexity  o f  th e  task.
In  addition, th e  notio n  that using  on e 's  feelin gs as in fo rm a tio n  m ay sim plify  
co m p lex  ju d gm en ts accord ing to a "H o w  do I feel about it? "  h eu ristic  predicts that 
th e  less relevant a jud gm en t is, the few er consequen ces it has, and the h ig h er the 
tim e p ressu re under w hich  it is m ade, th e  m ore p ronounced  m ood e ffec ts  should 
be (cf. K ru g lan sk i, 1 9 8 0 ). S im ilarly , co m p etin g  p ro cessin g  dem ands, w hich  lim it 
th e  available co gn itiv e capacity , should increase reliance o n  th is  heuristic, as has 
been  show n w ith  regard  to  th e  use o f  o th e r  heu ristics (se e  S h erm a n  & Corry,
1 9 8 4 ). T h e s e  im p lication s await fu rth er research .
On the Re/ationship of Recall and Judgment
As em p hasized  previously, th e  findings review ed in th e  p re sen t ch ap ter are 
in co m p atib le  w ith  m odels th a t assum e that m ood effects on  evaluative judgm ents 
a rc  m ediated  by m ood -congruent m em ory (e.g .. B o w er, 198 1 ; C lark  & Isen , 1982 ; 
Isen , 1 9 8 4 b ). T h e  results o f  th e  rep orted  m isattrlbu rion  ex p e rim en ts  can n o t be 
accounted  for by these m odels, and  the im pact o f  m oods o n  evaluative jud gm ents 
has been  show n to  be u n affected  by variab les th a t are  likely to a ffec t selective 
recall. A s noted  befo re , how ever, th is does not necesssarily  im ply th at m odels o f  
m ood -con gru en t recall are inadequate as m odels o f  recall. R a th e r , these findings 
sim p ly  suggest th a t evaluative ju d g m en ts m ay frequ ently  n o t be based on  recalled 
in fo rm atio n  (see  Schw arz, 198 7 , for a m ore  detailed  d iscu ssion).
A s m any au th ors have noted, th e  re la tio n sh ip  b etw een  evaluative jud gm ents 
and th e  recall o f  in fo rm atio n  upon w hich these ju d g m en ts are  presum ably  based 
is frequ ently  w eak (e.g ., A nd erson  ie H u bert, 196 3 ; B argh  & T h e m , 1985 ; 
C arls to n  & Skow ron ski, 1 9 8 6 ; D reb en , F iske, 6l H astie , 1 9 7 9 ; L in g ie  & O stro m ,
1 9 7 9 ). T h is  is usually in terp re ted  to  ind icate th a t su b jects are  reca lling  a ju d gm ent 
that was m ade "o n -lin e "— th at is, at th e  tim e th e  relevant in fo rm atio n  was 
received , ra th e r than  at th e  tim e  they are  asked to rep o rt the ju d g m en t to the 
research er (cf. H astie  & Park, 198 6 ; L ich ten ste in  &  Sru ll, 1 9 8 5 ). A ccordingly, the
currently recalled behaviors may not be th e on es (hat served as a basis o f  judgm ent 
in the first place, and this may result in weak re la tionsh ip s betw een both 
m easures.
T h e  presen r find ings suggest, how ever, th a t the d istin ction  betw een "o n ­
lin e" and "retriev a l-b ased " judgm ents is n o t exhaustive. R a th e r , there is a third 
type o f ju d gm ent, w hich is based neither on o n -lin e  p rocessin g  o f  features o f the 
target nor on any retrieved features o f  th e  target. Sp ecifically , evaluative judg­
m en ts may be based on  potentially  unrelated  in fo rm atio n  (such as on e’s ow n 
affective s ta te ) that is considered heuristically  relevant. T h e s e  "h eu ristic-b ased ” 
jud gm ents are likely to reduce the rela tion sh ip  betw een recall and evaluation even 
m ore than  "o n -lin e "  jud gm ents, g iven that th e ir  in form ational basis may p o ten ­
tially  b e com pletely  unrelated  to features o f  th e  ob ject o f  ju d g m en t, as on e  m ight 
exp ect in the case o f the w eather (Schw arz & C lore, 1 9 8 3 ) , d im e (Schw arz, 1 9 8 3 ), 
o r soccer (Schw arz et al., 1987) exp e rim en ts  discussed earlier.
judgments as Recall Cues?
Finally, it is w orth noting that a reversal o f the generally  assum ed influence 
o f  affective states on the retrieval o f valenced in fo rm atio n  is conceivable. As a 
consid erable body o f social co gn ition  research  indicates (see  M artin  Si Clark, in 
p ress, for a review ), individuals may use previously form ed jud gm ents as a basis 
fo r subsequent on es, independently o f the in fo rm ation  on  w hich  th e judgm ent 
was orig inally  based (e.g., C arlston, 1 9 8 0 ; L in g le  & O stro m , 1 9 7 9 ). M ore im p o r­
tantly, they may also use a judgm ent as a retrieval cue for reconstructing  the 
in form ation  that presum ably provided th e basis o f  judgm ent in the first place, as 
was recently  d em onstrated  by H iggins and colleagues (H ig g in s Sr Lurie, 1983 ; 
H ig g ins & S tan go r, 1988).
A pplied  to the p resent reasoning, th is ra ises the possibility  that individuals' 
a ffective state may influ en ce their evaluative jud gm ents, w hich in rurn m ay serve 
as m ood -congruent retrieval cues, resulting in  m ood -congruent recall. T o  use one 
o f  B o w er’s (1 9 8 1 )  exam p les, individuals w ho are  asked to recall even ts from  their 
k ind ergarten  days may first ask them selves, "W e ll, k in d ergarten  days. W h at were 
they lik e?" In  doing so, they may form  a g lobal evaluation that is based on th eir 
cu rren t m ood, as described above. Facing th e  task to rep ort sp ecific  episodes, they 
m ay then  use th is global evaluation as a re triev al cue to guide the recall o f specific 
in form ation , resulting in an increased reca ll— o r recon stru ction — o f m ood-con- 
g ru ent in form ation .
O n e im p o rtan t im p lication  o f this reason in g  is th a t m ood effects  on recall 
should only be obtained under cond itions that g ive rise to m ood effects on 
evaluative ju d gm ents in the first place. A ccordingly, m isattribu tion  m anipulations 
o f the type we used (Schw arz i t  C lore, 1 983) should elim in ate  the im pact of 
m oods on  the recall o f  m ood-congruent in fo rm atio n  from  m em ory. A lthough 
e x p e rim en ta l tests o f this possibility  are n o t yet available, it is conceivable that 
v ariations in the perceived inform ational value o f o n e 's  mood may underlie the 
in co n sisten t findings in the literatu re on m ood -congruent m em ory.
Conclusions
In  su m m ary, th e  research  reviewed in the first part o f  this ch ap ter has d em o n­
strated  that a ffective states may serve in form ativ e functions, and th at individuals 
may form  evaluative ju d g m en ts o n  the basis o f th e ir  feelin g s. In  doing so, 
how ever, they may m isread feelings that w ere elicited  by o th er causes as affective 
reaction s to  th e  o b ject o f  ju d gm en t, resultin g  in m ore p o sitiv e  evaluations in the 
p re sen ce  o f  positive ra th e r than  negative feelings. T h e  assum p tio n  that feelings 
serve as in fo rm a tio n  im p lies th a t the in form ation  th at is provided by them  is 
processed  in th e  sam e way as any o th e r  p iece o f in form atio n  is. In  lin e w ith this 
assu m p tio n , th e  review ed research  ind icates that the in fo rm atio n  provided by 
o n e 's  fee lin g s is only used in m akin g evaluative ju d gm en ts if it is relevant to the 
ju d g m en t at hand , and if its in form atio n a l value is n o t d iscredited . A ccordingly, 
m ood e ffec ts  w ere not obtained  w hen resp ondents w ere induced to a ttrib u te  th eir 
cu rren t m ood to  a tran sien t, ex tern a l source, thus ca llin g  its d iagnosticity  into 
q u estion  (e .g ., Schw arz Sc C lore , 1983 ; Schw arz e t al., 1 985). M o reover, m oods 
have been  found to  in flu en ce a wide variety o f  evaluative ju d gm en ts (e .g ., Jo h n so n  
& T v ersk y , 1 9 8 3 ) , w hereas the in fo rm ation  provided by sp ecific  em o tio n s appears 
to  be  m o re  sp e cific , thus lim itin g  the range o f ju d gm ents likely to  be influenced 
(e.g ., G a lla g h e r Sc C lore, 198 5 ; K e ltn e r  &  A udrain, 1 9 8 8 ). In addition, the im pact 
o f  a ffectiv e  s ta tes  has been found to  decrease as the sa lience (C o llin s Sc C lark, 
1 9 8 9 ; S tra ck  e t  al., 1 9 8 5 ) o r  am ount (S c h w a r i et a l., 1 9 8 7 ; Sru ll, 1983 , 1 9 8 4 ) of 
o th e r  in fo rm a tio n  relevant to  th e  judgm ent at hand increases.
A lth o u gh  these fin d in gs have repeatedly been co ntrasted  to predictions 
derived from  m ood -con gru en t recall m odels, it is also im p o rtan t to h ig h lig h t th e ir 
re la tio n sh ip  to o th e r, m ore  closely  related approaches. M ost obviously, the p re ­
se n t ap p roach  builds, both  theo retically  and exp erim en ta lly , on previous m isattri- 
bu tion  research . So m e o f th is research  addressed the in fluen ce o f  perceived 
co n tex t o n  th e  in terp re ta tio n  o f  physical arousal (S ch ä ch ter Sc S in g er, 1962), 
w hereas o th e r  research  exp lo red  th e  im pact o f physical arousal on  attirudinal 
ju d g m en ts (e .g ., Z a n n a  Sc C ooper, 1974). In  general, th e  la tter research  indicated 
that physical arousal w ill only influence jud gm ents if  th e  o b je c t  o f  jud gm en t is 
seen  as th e  source o f  arousal. A lth ou gh  th e  orig in al accounts for th is finding w ere 
couched in so m ew h at d ifferen t te rm s— they w ere related  e ith e r  to a d issonance 
fram ew o rk  (see  Z an n a  Sc C ooper, 1976 , for a review ) o r to an excita tio n  tran sfer 
fram ew o rk  (se e  Z illm a n , 1 978 , fo r a review )— they ind icate that perceived ph ysi­
cal arousal w ill on ly  in fluen ce evaluative jud gm ents if its in fo rm atio n a l value for 
th e  resp ectiv e ju d g m en t is not discredited.
T h e  " fe e lin g s-a s -in fo rm a tio n "  ap p roach  p resented  in the p resen t ch ap ter is 
clearly  co m p a tib le  w ith  these previous lines o f  research  and exten d s this w ork in 
several ways. M ost im p o rtan tly , th e  w ork by Z an n a , C ooper, and colleagues, as 
w ell as th a t by Z illm a n  and co lleagues, was p rim arily  concerned  w ith the su b jec­
tiv e  e x p e rie n ce  o f  arousal (o fte n  in the co n text o f  d issonance m o tiv atio n ), rath er 
than  the im p lica tio n s o f  the valence o f the exp erien ced  sta te  (but see H iggins, 
R h od ew alt, & Z a n n a , 1 979 , for an ex ce p tio n ). A lth ou gh the research  procedures
w ere tailored  to d iscred it the im p lications o f arousal s ta tes, th e  in form ational 
value o f these sta tes was not explicitly  elaborated . A ccordingly, this line o f 
research did not invite d ifferentia tio n s betw een m oods and em otio ns, ex p lo ra ­
tions o f the sp ecific  in form ational value o f d ifferen t a ffective states, o r th eir 
linkage to in form ation  p rocessin g  in general. T h is  d ifferen ce  in focus reflects 
general d ifferen ces in the theoretical orien ta tio n  o f social psychology in the early 
1970s and the m id -1980s (see  M arkus Sc Z a jo n c, 1 9 8 5 ). T h is  becom es particularly 
ap p arent in th e  second p art o f  rhis ch ap ter, w hich addresses the im pact o f 
a ffective states on  strateg ies o f  in form ation  processing.
AFFECTIVE STATES AND THE CH O ICE 
O F PROCESSING STRATEGIES
So  far, the d iscussion o f  the in form ative functions o f  a ffectiv e states has focused 
on th e  im pact o f feelings on evaluative ju d gm ents. H ow ever, the in form ational 
value o f  on e's affective state may be m ore fu ndam ental than the preceding 
discussion o f evaluative jud gm en ts may suggest. As m any authors have pointed 
out (e.g ., A rnold, I9 6 0 ; Frijda, 1 988 ; H ig g in s, 1 987 ; O atley  Sc Jo h n so n -L aird , 
198 7 ; O rton y et al., 1 9 8 8 ), d ifferent affective sta tes are closely  linked to d ifferen t 
psychological situ ations. In  N ico  Frijda's w ords (1 9 8 8 , p. 3 4 9 ) , "em o tio n s arise in 
resp onse to th e  m eaning  structures o f  g iven  situ ations, [an d ] d ifferen t em otions 
arise in resp on se to d ifferen t m eaning stru ctu res ." In  g en era l, "ev en ts that satisfy 
the individual’s goals, o r p rom ise to do so, yield p ositive em o tio n s ; events that 
harm  o r threaten  the individual’s concerns lead to n egative em o tio n s" (p. 3 4 9 ).
I f  we exten d  these argum ents, it seem s p lau sib le to assum e that the re la tio n ­
sh ip  betw een em otio n s and the "m ean in g  stru ctu res" th a t co n stitu te  a "p sych o­
logical situ atio n ” (H ig g in s, 1 987) is b id irectional: D iffe r e n t  psychological situa­
tions result in d ifferent em otio ns, but the presence o f  a certa in  em otion  also 
inform s the individual about the nature o f his o r  h e r cu rren t psychological 
situ ation . A r a general level, one may assum e that a positive  affective state 
in form s the individual that the w orld is a safe place, o n e  that does not threaten  
the p erson ’s current goals. T h a t is, p ositive feelings tell the p erson that the 
cu rren t situ ation  is characterized  n e ith er by a lack o f  p o sitiv e  outcom es nor by a 
threat o f negative ou tcom es. N egative affectiv e sta tes, o n  the o th e r  hand, in form  
the individual that the cu rren t situation is p ro b lem atic , and th a t it is characterized  
e ith er by a lack o f p o sitive ourcom es o r by a th reat o f  negative ou tcom es— a 
d istinction  that is elaborated  on below . If  th is is so , o n e ’s affectiv e  sta te  can serve 
as a sim p le  bur highly sa lien t indicator o f  th e  natu re o f the situ ation  o n e  is in.
T o the ex ten t that individuals are m otivated  to ob ta in  p ositive ou tcom es and 
to avoid negative ones, negative em otion s do th ere fo re  in fo rm  the individual that 
som e action needs to be taken, ftjs itiv e  em o tio n s , on  the o th er hand, may not 
signal a p articu lar action requ irem ent. Indeed, em p irical evidence indicates th at 
d ifferen t em o tio n s are  associated  w ith d ifferen t sta tes o f action  read iness; these 
are evident in physiological changes (e.g., Lacey & Lacey, 1 9 7 0 ; O brist, 1981) and
ov ert behavior (e .g ., E k m an , 1 9 8 2 ; h a r d , 1 9 7 7 ) , as w ell as in in trosp ectiv e reports 
(e.g ., D avitz, 196 9 ; Frijd a , 1 986 , 1 9 8 7 ). T h is  evidence su pports the assum ption 
th at "e m o tio n s  ex is t fo r th e  sake of sig n alin g  states o f  the w orld th at have to be 
responded to, o r th a t no lon ger need resp o n se and a ctio n ” (F rijd a , 1988, p. }5 4 ) .
T h e  rem ain d er o f th is ch ap ter re la tes these  co n sid eratio n s to a variety o f 
d ifferen ces in in fo rm a tio n  p ro cessin g  th a t have been observed under th e  influence 
o f  p o sitive and negative a ffectiv e sta tes. H ow ever, the reader should be fo re ­
w arned: A lth ou gh  th e  evidence bearing  o n  the in fo rm atio n a l value o f affective 
sta tes for evaluative ju d g m en ts is fairly  persuasive, th e  fo llow in g discussion of 
d ifferen ces in p ro cessin g  strateg y  goes far beyond any data given.
Affect, Motivation, and Information Processing
T h e  sig n ifican ce  o f  th e  above-described  co nsid erations for in form atio n  processing 
derives from  the assu m p tio n  that d ifferen t psychological situ ation s, reflected  in 
d iffe re n t affect s ta tes , req u ire  d ifferen t in fo rm atio n -p ro cessin g  strateg ies.
If  po sitive  a ffectiv e  srates in form  the individual that his o r h er personal 
w orld is cu rren tly  a sa fe  and satisfactory  place, the individual may see little  need to 
en gag e in co gn itiv e  e ffo rt , unlest  th is is required by o th e r  cu rrently  active goals. 
In  pursuing these g oats, th e  individual m ay also be w illing  to  take som e risk, given 
th a t the g en era l situ atio n  is considered  safe. T h u s, s im p le  heu ristics may be 
p re ferred  to m o re  e ffo rtfu l, d eta il-o rien ted  jud gm ental stra teg ies, new procedures 
and p o ssib ilities m ay b e  exp lo red ; and unusual, creativ e associations may be 
e laborated . A ccordingly , th e  th o u g ht processes o f  individuals in a positive  a ffec­
tive sta te  m ay be ch aracterized  by w hat F ied ler (1 9 8 8 ) , borrow ing a term  from  
G eo rg e  K elly  ( 1 9 5 5 ) ,  has called  "lo o sen in g ."
By co n trast, if  negative affective sta tes in fo rm  th e  individual about a lack o f 
p ositive  ou tcom es o r  a  th re a t o f negative ou tcom es, th e  individual may be m o ti­
vated to ch ange h is o r  h e r  cu rren t situ ation . A ttem p ts to ch ange th e  situation, 
how ever, in itia lly  req u ire  a carefu l assessm en t o f  th e  featu res o f the cu rrent 
situ atio n , an analysis o f th e ir causal links, detailed  exp lo ra tio n s o f  possible 
m echan ism s o f  ch a n g e , and an tic ip atio n  o f  the p o ten tia l ou tcom es o f any action 
th at m ig h t be in itia ted . M o reo v er, individuals m ay b e  unlikely  to  take risks in a 
situ atio n  th at is a lready consid ered  p ro b lem atic , and m ay th e re fo re  avoid sim p le 
heuristics as w ell as novel so lu tio ns. A ccordingly, th e ir  thou g ht processes may be 
ch aracterized  by w hat F ied ler (1 9 8 8 )  has term ed  "t ig h te n in g " ; again , th e  te rm  is 
borrow ed from  K elly  (1 9 5 5 ) .
In  sum m ary, th e se  co n sid era tio n s suggest th a t individuals' thou ght processes 
are runed to  m eet th e  req u irem en ts o f  the psychological situ ation  that is reflected 
in th e ir  feelin gs. C o ncep tu ally  related  to  th is arg u m en t, H eckhau sen , G ollw itzer, 
and th eir co llab ora to rs (see  G ollw itzer, C h ap ter 2 , th is volum e, for a review ) have 
show n that d iffe re n t m otiv atio n al sta tes, conceptualized  in th e  co n tex t of a 
co m p reh en siv e  action  theory , e lic it d iffe ren t "m in d -se ts "  that are  tuned to the 
req u irem en ts o f  th e  resp ectiv e state. T h is  tuning assu m p tio n  has in terestin g
im p lications for individuals' thoughts «bout the a ffect-e lic itin g  situation, as w ell 
as for th e ir p erfo rm an ce  on unrelated tasks. F o r the sake o f  sim plicity, the 
follow ing d iscussion o f these im plications focuses on the contribu tion s o f affective 
s ta tes; the im pact of third  variables, such as h ig h er-ord er goals, is addressed in a
later section .
Affective Slates and Event-Related Thoughts
Focus of Attention
As a first hypothesis, it follow s that individuals in a negative affective state 
should be m ore likely to focus th e ir  a tten tio n  on features o f  the situation  that 
elicited  rh eir feelings. In fact, a large body o f  literatu re ind icates a narrow ing of 
atten tio n a l focus under negative affect (see  B road ben t, 1 971 ; B run er, M atter, & 
Papanek, 1 9 5 5 ; E asterbrook , 1959 ; Eysenck, 1 9 7 6 ). A s a recen t exam p le, W egner 
and V allacher (1 9 8 6 )  observed that failures to  ob tain  a desired outcom e are m ore 
likely to e licit a tten tio n  to details o f one's action strategy than are successful 
actions.
In  addition, one may expect individuals in a situation  that e licits negative 
affect to be less likely  to encode incidental in fo rm ation , and less likely ro get 
d istracted  by o th e r  tasks. C onsisten t w ith th is  assum p tion , Fuhrm an and O strom  
(1 9 8 9 )  observed  that subjects in a p erson m em ory ex p e rim en t paid m ore a tte n ­
tion to  in fo rm atio n  th a t elicited a pronounced negative reaction , and presum ably 
sp e n t m ore tim e  th in k in g  about it, as had previously been observed by Fiske
(1 9 8 0 )  for negative p erson  in form ation  in gen eral. A s a consequence, Fuhrm an 
and O stro m 's  su b jects had excellen t m em ory fo r  the a ffect-e lic itin g  in form ation  
as w ell as related  item s, but m issed subsequently  presented  in form atio n  that was 
unrelated  to  th e  a ffect-elicitin g  item s.
F inally, n egative affect may also be accom panied  by an increased readiness to 
engage in e ffo rtfu l strateg ies ro obtain  in form ation  that is relevant to th e situ a­
tion at hand. A lth ou gh the available em p irica l evidence that bears on  these 
hyp o theses is scarce, the hypotheses are clearly  testable.
Causal Reasoning
In  addition, o n e  m ay assum e that individuals in a negative affective state  are 
m ore likely to engage in causal reasoning about the a ffect-e lic itin g  event than  are 
individuals in a positive affective state. Such an asym m etry  has repeatedly been 
observed in the a ttr ib u tio n  literatu re. Sp ecifically, it has been found that negative 
events, w hich  e licit negative feelings, are m o re  likely to trigger causal ex p lan a­
tions th an  arc positive  events (e.g., A bele, 1 9 8 5 ; Schw arz, 1987; W einer, 1985b; 
W ong & W einer, 1 9 8 0 ). In  lin e .w ith  this assu m p tion , th e  m isartribu tion  e x p e ri­
m ents review ed above (Schw arz & C lore, 1983) revealed that su bjects w ho w ere in 
a bad mood w ere m ore likely to search for a situ ational exp lan atio n  o f  their mood 
than  su b jects in a good m ood w ere; this resulted in the observed asym m etric 
im pact o f  p ositive and negative m oods on evaluative judgm ents.
In a related  srudy (Schw arz, 1 987 , E x p e rim e n t 9 ) ,  co llege students w ho w ere 
asked to d escribe a p ositive o r a negative life  event w ere m ore likely to provide 
unclicited  causal exp lan atio n s for negative ( 3 8 % )  than  for p o sitive ( 1 8 % )  events. 
M oreover, if a causal exp lan atio n  was offered , it was provided earlie r  in the 
d escrip tion  if  the ev en t was negative (sp ecifically , a fte r  10.2 w ords) than if the 
event was p o sitive (a fte r  4 1 .0  w ord s); th is  suggests that causal exp lan atio n s are 
m ore accessible in th e  cogn itive rep resen ta tio n  o f  negative ra th er than  positive 
events.
H ow ever, find ings o f this type are d ifficu lt to in terp re t because o f a natural 
confound o f valence and exp ectan cy : As m any attrib u tion  th eo rists  have noted, 
unpleasant events are seen  as less likely than  p leasant on es in everyday life. 
A ccordingly, the su b jectiv e probability  o f the event and its hedonic quality are 
naturally confounded. T h e  u n exp ected ness o f an even t, how ever, has been found 
to trig ger causal exp lan atio n s in its ow n rig h t (see  H astie , 1984 , for a review ). To 
isolate the co n trib u tio n  o f both  variables, we (B o h n er, B less, Schw arz, & Strack, 
1988) conducted a laboratory  ex p e rim en t that provided ind ependent m anip ula­
tions o f the su b jectiv e pro bab ility  o f  an event and its hedonic valence. Specifically, 
the su bjects received e ith e r  success o r failure feedback about th e ir  p erfo rm an ce on 
an o sten sib le  "p ro fe ssio n a l sk ills test.” In  addition, the su b jectiv e probability  o f 
success was varied by in form in g  su b jects that e ith e r 2 3 %  o r  7 7 %  o f  a com p arable 
student pop u lation  had m et the criterio n . Follow ing success o r failure feedback, 
su bjects w ere asked to w rite dow n everyth ing that cam e to  m ind, and finally 
provided a d irect rating  o f  th e  in tensity  w ith w hich they tried to exp la in  their test 
result.
T h e se  m an ip u lation s produced pronounced m ain e ffec ts  o f the valence o f  the 
ou tcom e: A s predicted  by th e  cu rren t analysis, the nu m ber o f p ossible reasons 
that su b jects sp ontan eously  rep orted  for the ou tcom e was g rea ter a fte r  negative 
than a fte r  positive  feedback, regardless  o f  th e  o u tco m e s a p rio ri probability . In 
addition, su b jects rep orted  a h ig h er in tensity  o f causal reason in g  a fter negative 
than  a fter positive  feedback. A dditional co rre la tio n a l analyses indicated th at the 
num ber o f  causal ex p lan atio n s rep orted , as w ell as the in ten sity  ratings, increased 
w ith increasin g  negativ ity  o f su b jects’ cu rren t a ffectiv e state.
In  su m m ary , these  findings ind icate th at su b jects w ere m ore likely to  exp la in  
a negative event, w hich  elicited  negative feelin g s, than  to  exp la in  a p o sitiv e  event, 
w hich elicited  p ositiv e  feelin gs. G iven  that the probab ility  o f  th e  ou tcom e was 
held co n stan t, these fin d in gs d em o n stra te  th a t th e  valence o f the event, and its 
accom panying affectiv e  reaction , co n stitu te  a d eterm in an t o f th e  d egree o f causal 
reason ing in th e ir  ow n right.
A t a m ore g en era l level, H olyoak and N isb ett (1 9 8 8 , p. 6 1 )  have observed 
that "p e o p le  m ake in feren ces on ly  w hen th ere  is so m e trig g erin g  cond ition . A n 
event o r  re la tio n sh ip  m ust be p ro b lem atic , un exp ected , o r  at least in terestin g , 
before p eop le begin to  m ake in fe re n ce s."  T h e  p resen t arg u m en t holds th at 
ex p e rien cin g  negative feelin gs may be o n e  o f  th e  co nd ition s in fo rm in g  individuals 
that an event o r re la tio n sh ip  is "p ro b le m a tic ,"  and may thus serv e as a triggering  
condition .
Generalization to O ther Tasks
So far, the reviewed evidence has p ertained  to  su b jects' reasoning about th e  
situ ation  that elicited  the affective state to begin  with. A lthou gh th is is in terestin g  
in its ow n rig h t, it also raises the m ore in trigu ing  possibility  that the im pact of 
a ffectiv e  sta tes may generalize to o th e r  tasks that individuals w ork on w hile in 
that state . W hy m ight such a g eneralization  occur?
O n  the on e  hand, the d iscussion above su ggests that d ifferen t affective states 
may elicit d ifferent m otivations (see  Sch aller & C ialdini, C h ap ter 8, this volum e, 
for a related  discussion). M ost im p ortantly , individuals in a negative sta te , for 
w hom  the situ ation  is already defined as p ro b lem atic , may be m ore m otivated  to 
avoid (add itional) negative outcom es and less w illing to engage in "risk y " s tra te ­
g ies than  individuals in a positive affective sta te , for w hom  the cu rrent situ ation  is 
defined as safe. In fact, individuals in an elated  m ood have been  found to be m ore 
o p tim istic  about future events than  individuals in a depressed mood (e.g., Forgas 
& M oylan, 198 7 ; Jo h n so n  & T versky, 1983; M asters & Fu rm an, 1976), to (e rro n e ­
ously) p erceiv e m ore control over th eir cu rren t en v iron m en t (e.g., A lloy & 
A b ram son , 1 9 7 9 ; Alloy, A bram son, 4  Viscusi, 1981), and to be m ore w illing to 
rake m oderate risks (e.g., Isen, M eans, Patrick , & N ow icky, 1 9 8 2 ).
In addition to changes in individuals' m otiv ation al sta te , affective states may 
in flu en ce th e  cognitive accessibility of procedural know ledge in m em ory, i f  one 
assum es that analytic reasoning is helpful in handling negative situations, it 
should be highly adaptive if the negative affectiv e states accom panying these 
situ ations increase the cognitive accessibility  o f  relevant procedural know ledge. 
T h is  should increase the speed w ith w hich adequate procedures can be applied to 
the negative situation. M oreover, it should decrease resp on se co m p etition  b e ­
tw een various ap plicable procedures, thus reducing the likelihood that o th e r  
p oten tia lly  ap plicable but less effective procedures will be selected.
H ow ever, any m echanism  increasing  the accessibility  o f  analytic procedures 
to facilita te  th e ir ap plication  to the a ffect-e lic itin g  situation  may also increase the 
accessibility  o f  th e sam e procedures per se , resu ltin g  in a h ig h er likelihood that 
they will be applied  to any  task to  w hich they are ap plicable (see  H igg ins, 1989, 
fo r a review o f  research  on accessibility e ffec ts ). A ccordingly, subjects in a bad 
m ood should be m ore likely to apply analytic processin g  strateg ies to cogn itive 
tasks th a t they w ork on w hile in that m ood than  su bjects in  an elated m ood should 
be. Evidence from  diverse areas of research is com p atible w ith  these assum ptions.
Information Seeking
i f  b e in g  in a bad m ood in form s individuals that th e ir  cu rren t situ ation  is 
p ro b lem atic , it may increase th e ir  w illingness to engage in e ffortfu l in form atio n  
seek in g , and it m ay tune th eir a tten tio n  to m ore d iagnostic in form ation . T h e  
cu rren t evidence bearing  on th is assum p tion  is lim ited to depressed individuals, 
w ho are ch ron ically  in a bad mood. For exam p le , in a study on social in form ation  
g a th erin g , H ild ebran d -Sain ts and W eary (1 9 8 9 )  observed that mildly depressed  
co llege stud ents asked m ore highly d iagnostic qu estions o f th eir in teraction
p artn ers than  no nd ep ressed 'college stu d ents did. M o reover, they did so ind ep en­
dently  o f w h eth er they exp ected  having to answ er subsequent questions about 
th eir in teraction  p artn er o r  not, w hereas nondepressed  su bjects only asked highly 
d iagn ostic  questions if  th a t seem ed useful for a later task. T h e  authors assum e 
that “th is heigh tened  in fo rm atio n  seekin g and u tilization  are m otivated by de- 
pressives' attem p ts to reduce th e  u n certain ty  and lack of co n tro l w hich accom pa­
nies th e ir d ep ression " (M arsh  & W eary, 1 989 , p. 3 2 6 ) . A ccording to th e  p resent 
argu m en t, sim ply b ein g  in a negative affective sta te  may e licit the sam e m otiv a­
tio n , regardless o f  individuals' ch ron ic depressive sta te , althou gh data bearing  on 
this hyp othesis are not yet available.
Focus of Attention and the Encoding 
and Organization of Information
W ith  regard to th e  findin g th at negative events e licit a narrow er focus of 
a tte n tio n , the gen eralizatio n  hyp othesis would predict that in form atio n  that is 
encoded w hile  the p erson  is in a bad m ood w ill be categorized m ore narrow ly and 
stored  in sm aller chunks than  in fo rm atio n  that is encoded w hile the p erson  is in a 
good m ood. Several studies bear on th is pred iction . For exam p le, Leight and Ellis
(1 9 8 1 )  found that a depressed  m ood inh ib ited  chunking, resulting  in decreased 
recall o f  n onsense w ords. C onversely , Isen , O au bm an, and G orgo g lio n e (1 9 8 7 ) 
rep orted  increased chun king and increased recall p erfo rm an ce under positive 
m ood.
A s Isen  (1 9 8 4 a , p. 5 3 5 )  observed, ''p o sitiv e  affect results in an organ izatio n  
o f co gn itiv e m aterial, such that e ith e r  m ore o r broader, m ore in tegrated , categ o­
rie s"  are  used. For exam p le, item s that are not generally  considered good e x e m ­
plars o f  a category (e.g ., "c a n e "  as a m em b er o f  the category  "c lo th in g ")  were 
m ore  likely to be assigned to that category  by su bjects in an elated  m ood than by 
su b jects  in a no nm anipu lated  m ood (Isen  Si D aubm an, 1 9 8 4 ). S im ilarly , subjects 
in an elated  m ood w ere found to so rt stim u li in to  few er groupings, again su ggest­
ing  th e  use o f  broad er ca teg ories (Isen  &  D au bm an, 1 9 8 4 ). R elated  research  by 
S in c la ir  (1 9 8 8 ) , conductcd  in a p erfo rm an ce  ap praisal paradigm , confirm ed  that 
su b jects in an elated  m ood used broader categ ories than  su b jects in a neutral 
m ood, and indicated that su b jects in a depressed m ood categorized  d ifferent 
p erfo rm a n ce  behaviors m o st narrow ly. M oreo ver, th is narrow  categ orization  
elicited  by a negative m ood resulted  in m ore accurate p erfo rm an ce  ap praisals and 
less evidence for halo e ffects .
A particularly  in teres tin g  ex am p le  o f  en cod in g  d ifferences was rep orted  by 
F ied ler et al. (1 9 8 6 ) , w ho crossed  elated and depressed  m oods w ith  m em ory and 
im p ressio n  fo rm atio n  in stru ctio n s in a p erso n  m em ory e x p e rim en t. A lthou gh 
im p ressio n  fo rm atio n  in stru ctio n s usually resu lt in increased  recall, due to the 
org an iza tio n  form at o f  th e  resu ltin g  rep resen ta tion  (cf. H am ilto n , K a tz , & L eirer,
1 9 8 0 ) , F iedler e t  al. observed an  in teractio n  o f  in stru ctio n s and m ood state : 
"R e c a ll p erfo rm an ce  was su p erior w hen p ositive m ood was com bined  w ith im ­
p ression  fo rm atio n  in stru ctio n s, and w h en  n egativ e m ood was com bin ed  w ith 
m em ory in stru ctio n s" (Fied ler, 198 8 , p . 105 ). P resu m ably , the narrow er focus o f
a tten tio n  under negative m ood, resulting  in narro w er categorization s, inhibited  
th e  o rg an iza tio n  o f  rhe m aterial under im p ressio n  fo rm atio n  instru ctions, but 
facilitated  the e ffortfu l learn in g  o f the m aterial under exp licit m em ory in stru c­
tions.
Analytic Reasoning
T h e  p ro p en sity  o f negative affective states to e lic it a h ig h er d egree o f  causal, 
analytic reason ing  has repeatedly been observed to  g en eralize  to  unrelated  tasks 
that individuals w ork on w hile in a negative m ood. F o r exam p le, individuals in 
exp erim en tally  induced bad m oods (e.g ., Schw arz, K o m m er, & Lessle, 1 9 8 8 ), as 
w ell as subjects in naturally depressed m oods (e .g .. A lloy &. A bram son , 1979) 
w ere found to provide m ore accurate contingency assessm en ts than  individuals in 
elated  m ood s— a fin ding that has becom e know n as "d ep ressiv e rea lism " (see  
R u ehlm an , W est, & Pasahow, 1985, for a review ). A lth ou gh  th is fin ding is usually 
attributed  to the im pact of chronically or tem p orarily  accessible depressive sch e ­
m ata, the finding that depressed m oods facilita te  covariation d etection  under 
condition s that are ne ither se lf-re feren tia l n o r co n tro l-re la ted  suggests th a t it may 
be m ediated by p rocessin g  style rather than by th e  im pact o f  depressive schem ata.
For exam p le, S in cla ir (1 9 8 7 , E x p erim en t 2 )  had subjects estim ate  co rrelatio n  
co efficien ts from  scatterp lots presented  to  them . H e found that su b jects in a 
depressed m ood provided the m ost accurate estim a tes  and su b jects in an elated 
mood the least accurate on es, w ith su bjects in  a nonm anipulated  m ood falling  in 
betw een. H e concluded that "elated  su bjects are  taking less care, p ro cessin g  m ore 
heuristically , [an d ] m aking m ore e rro rs "  (p . 16). Su b jects in a depressed m ood, on 
th e  o th e r  hand, “may process in a m ore a lg orith m ic m ann er, leading to  narrow er 
categ orizatio n , w eighing of m ore in fo rm a tio n , and less e rro r  in ju d g m en t" 
(p  18). C o n sisten t w ith this assum ption, h e found in a related study (S in cla ir, 
1 988) that su bjects in a depressed mood considered m ore in fo rm atio n  in m aking 
p erfo rm an ce ap p raisals than  did subjects in an elated  m ood, w ith  su b jects in a 
nonm anipu lated  m ood again falling in betw een . M o reover, th e  p erfo rm an ce  
appraisals provided by depressed subjects corresp on ded  m ore closely  to the 
num ber o f  p o sitiv e or negative behaviors p resen ted  than  did the p erfo rm a n ce  
app raisals provided by elated su bjects; this suggested  that elated  su b jects may 
"fo rm  sw eeping g lobal im p ressions," w hereas depressed su b jects m ay "assess 
m ore facts and m ake m ore d iscrete ju d g m en ts" (p . 39 ).
In line w ith th e  assum ption o f  m o re  analytic and a lg o rith m ic  processin g  
under the in flu en ce o f depressed m oods, F ied ler and Fladung (1 9 8 6 ; cited in 
Fiedler, 1 988) observed th at su bjects in an induced bad m ood produced few er 
logical in co nsisten cies in a m u ltiattribu te  d ecision  task than  su b jects in a good 
m ood. Sp ecifically , th e good-m ood su bjects, by producing in co n sis ten t triads o f  
the form  "A  >  B and B >  C, but A <  C ,” w ere tw ice as likely to violate the 
transitiv ity  o f p re feren ce  as the bad-m ood su b jects were.
M o reo v er, in the dom ain o f p ersuasion research , individuals in  depressed  
moods w ere sh ow n to pay m ore a tten tio n  to th e  quality o f  persuasive argu m ents. 
Sp ecifically, they w ere influenced by stro n g  but not by w eak argu m ents. Individu-
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als in a good  m ood , on  th e  o th er hand, w ere equally persuaded by stron g  and by 
w eak arg u m en ts , and co gn itiv e resp onse m easures indicated that they w ere less 
likely to  e la b o ra te  th e  quality o f the argu m en ts (B less , B oh n er, Schw arz, & Strack , 
in  p re ss ; W o rth  & M ackie, 1987). In fact, su bjects in a good m ood only paid 
a tte n tio n  to  th e  quality  o f th e  argu m en ts w hen they w ere exp licitly  instructed  to 
do so , w hereas individuals in a bad m ood did so sp ontaneously  (B le ss  et a)., 
in  p ress, E x p e r im e n t I ) .  A ccordingly, introducing a d istractor task inhibited  
m essage e la b o ra tio n  under bad-m ood cond ition s, but n o t under good-m ood co n d i­
tio n s ; th is  su ggested  th at su b jects  in a good m ood did not en gage in exten siv e  
m essage e la b o ra tio n  to  begin w ith (B less  et ai., in p ress, E x p erim en t 2 ).
C losely  related  to  th ese  findings, research  on the im pact o f a ffective sta tes on 
h e lp in g  behavior (se e  S ch a ller Sc C ialdini, C h ap ter 8, th is volum e, for a review ) 
su ggests th a t individuals in a dep ressed  mood base th e ir  help in g decisions on  a 
carefu l co n sid era tio n  o f  the involved costs and b enefits. By co n trast, su b jects in an 
elated  m ood seem  to  take a less considered  approach to help in g , and have been  
sh ow n to  be  rela tiv ely  unaffected  by perceived costs and be n efits  (e .g ., M anucia, 
B au m an , & C ia ld in i, 1 9 8 4 ; W eyent, 1978).
In co m b in a tio n , th is  d iverse set o f  findings (see  F ied ler, 1988 , for additional 
ex a m p le s) stro n g ly  su ggests th a t being  in a depressed m ood increases, and being 
in an  ela ted  m ood d ecreases, th e  likelihood  o f  a m ore analytic, carefu l, and 
d e lib era te  p ro cess in g  o f  th e  available in form ation .
Creativity
So  far, if see m s th a t the h yp othesis that negative affectiv e  states increase the 
co g n itiv e  accessib ility  o f  analytical reason in g p rocedures, as w ell as individuals' 
m oriv ation  to  en g ag e in these  e ffo rtfu l procedures, can w ell account for increased 
analy tic  reaso n in g  under negative a ffect. But how about th e  o th e r  side o f  the coin? 
It has a lso  been  observed  th at individuals in a good m ood are m ore creativ e than 
individuals in  a bad m ood. F o r exam p le, they w ere found to  be b e tter at solving 
D u n k er's  can d le  p ro b lem  and to g en era te  m ore unusual associations (see  Isen,
1 9 8 7 , fo r a review ).
If  p o sitiv e  a ffectiv e  sta tes in form  individuals that no p articu lar actio n  is 
required  by th e  cu rren t s itu a tio n , they may be un likely  to  activate any sp ecific  
p rocedure. A ccordingly , no resp on se h ierarchy that is tuned to  the cu rren t s itu a­
tio n  may be e lic ited , and d iffe re n t procedures may be equally accessible. If  so, 
individuals in a good m ood m ay be m ore likely to access a diverse ran g e o f 
p roced ures, and to  apply th e m  in co m b in atio n , th an  individuals in a bad m ood 
m ay be. M o reo v er, if e la ted  m oods arc associated  w ith a w ider focus o f a tten tio n  
than  negativ e  m oods, individuals in an elated  m ood m ay also draw upon a w ider 
range o f se m a n tic  and ep iso d ic know ledge. T h e  co m b in atio n  and ap p licatio n  of 
d iverse stra te g ie s  and heterogeneou s know ledge bases, how ever, is exactly  w hat is 
usually co n sid ered  to  be at the heart o f  creative p roblem  solving  (cf. M artin d ale , 
19 8 1 ; M ed n ick , 1 9 6 2 ) . In ad dition  to these  auto m atic in flu en ces o f know ledge 
accessib ility , p erson s in a good m ood may be less likely to consciously co n stra in  
th em se lv es, because th e ir  a ffectiv e sta te  in form s th em  th at th e ir cu rren t en v iron -
m em  is safe, and thus allow s them  to take th e  risk  that is associated  w ith novel 
solutions.
Individuals in a bad mood, on  the o th er hand, may be m ore constrain ed  in 
both respects. A t the level o f  access to  diverse procedural, sem antic , and episodic 
know ledge, the problem -o rien ted  set that is presum ably activated by being  in a 
bad m ood may inh ib it the accessibility  o f  o th er bodies o f know ledge (se e  H igg ins 
& K in g , 1 981 , for a general discussion o f tem porary  and ch ro n ic accessib ility ). At 
the m otiv ation al level, being in a bad mood m ay also reduce individuals' w illin g ­
ness to en gage in risky novel solutions, in  a situ ation  th at is already defined as 
problem atic . T h u s, m ood-induced d ifferences in creativ ity  may also be plausibly 
accounted for in the cu rrent fram ework.
When Are Tuning Effects lo Be Observed?
D o  the argu m en ts above im ply that one should  always find im proved  analytic 
p erfo rm an ce w hen individuals are in a bad m ood, and im paired  analytic p erfo r­
m ance w hen they are in a good m ood? D ay-to-day ex p e rien ce  suggests oth erw ise, 
ren d erin g  it necessary to consider conditions th a t seem  in co m p atib le  w ith  the 
p red ictions o ffered  above. R egard ing  im proved analytic p erfo rm an ce  in a bad 
m ood, the tw o excep tion s that seem  m ost likely to  co m e to  m ind p erta in  (1 )  to 
in terferen ce  e ffec ts  o f negative affect and (2 )  to  the apathy in h eren t in severe 
d epression. In addition, excep tion s to m ost hyp otheses can be readily constructed 
by referrin g  to the im pact o f  o th er currently  active goals th a t may in terfere  with 
the hypothesized  processes. Each o f  these p ossib ilities is considered in rurn.
Processing Capacity
To the ex te n t that handling the a ffect-e lic itin g  situation  binds a considerable 
degree o f su b jects ’ cognitive capacity, p erfo rm an ce  on  unrelated  tasks is likely to 
b e  inh ib ited . G iven th at negative situ ations need m ore a tten tio n  than  positive 
on es, this has been  m ost clearly d em onstrated  for negative a ffect (see  E aster- 
brook, 1959 ; Lazarus, 196(5). N o te , how ever, th a t this cond ition  may be unlikely to 
be m et in exp erim en ta l srudies, in w hich affectiv e states are  typically induced by 
vivid im agery o f fictitious events, feedback on already com p leted  tasks that may 
not be repeated , and sim ilar procedures th at fo rec lo se  real op p ortu n ities to 
change the negative situ ation  elicitin g  o n e s  feelin g s. Studies that vary the func­
tionality  o f  thoughts about the m ood-inducing event arc th ere fo re  obviously 
needed, but are  not yet available. M ost im p o rtantly , the im p act o f a ffectiv e stares 
on p erfo rm an ce on  unrelated  tasks needs to be com pared  under cond itions that do 
and do not allow  su bjects to change the a ffect-e lic itin g  situation .
S im ilarly , som e situations may require th a t individuals co ntro l th e ir  affective 
sta te  itself, o r  at least th e ir social display o f  th e ir  affective exp eriences. A gain, this 
task may bind considerable cognitive capacity, resulting  in im paired  cognitive 
p erfo rm an ce  on other  tasks. U n fortu nately , e x p e rim en ta l studies on  the im pact o f  
a ffect co ntro l on p erfo rm an ce on  unrelated tasks are not available. H ow ever, 
regarding individuals' thou ghts about the negative event itself, th e  available
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evidence suggests that an analytic reason ing sty le m ay not only serve to exp lain  
th e  even t, but may also reduce its em otio n al im pact. A s d iffe re n t lines o f  research 
have d em onstrated  (see  Schw arz, 1 9 8 7 , for a m ore detailed  d iscu ssion), the 
e m o tio n a l ex p e rien ce  is less in ten se  if  individuals' p ro cessin g  sty le  is ch aracter­
ized by a prep on d eran ce o f  analytic thoughts ra th e r th an  vivid im ages (e.g., 
Leyens, C isn ero s, & H ossey, 1 9 7 6 ; Sp iesm an , L azan is, M o rd k off, & D avidson, 
1 9 6 4 ; S track  et al., 1 9 8 5 ) . A ccordingly, a ttem p ts to  analyze on e 's feelin g s are 
likely to reduce th e ir  in tensity , as Ja m e s  (1 8 9 0 / 1 9 5 0 , p. 4 5 1 )  noted.
The Apathy Inherent in Severe Depression
R e g ard in g  co gn itive p erfo rm an ce  under severe clin ical d ep ression , clin ical 
ex p e rie n ce  as well as the literatu re  on  d epressive realism  (see R u eh lm an  et al.,
1 9 8 5 ) su ggest th a t severe d ep ression , in co n trast to be in g  in a "depressed  m ood ," 
is unlikely  to im p rove analytic p erfo rm an ce. It is in terestin g  to n o te , how ever, 
th a t p h en o m en o log ica l studies o f the su b jective ex p e rien ce  o f severe d epression  
(se e  T o lle , 1982 , p. 2 3 2  ff., for a review ) indicate that the ex p e rien ce  o f  "sa d n ess" 
o r o f "b e in g  in a bad m ood” is not p art o f  the m elan ch olic  sta te  that ch aracterizes 
severe d ep ressio n . A s L ehm ann (1 9 8 5 )  noted, "p erso n s w ho are  deeply depressed 
ca n n o t feel the sadness they used to be capable o f  fe e lin g .. . .  A lth ou gh  feelin g  an 
in to lera b le  o p p ress io n , these p erson s tend to be incap able o f  n o rm al g r ie f  o r  o f 
fee lin g  n o rm al co n cern " (pp. 7 9 2 - 7 9 3 ) .  It is thus conceivable that the su b jective 
exp e rien ces accom panying severe d ep ression  are  d iffe re n t in natu re from  the 
"n o rm a l"  negative affective states consid ered  in the p re sen t ch ap ter. M oreover, 
th ese  e x p e rien ces are  likely to endu re ov er very long periods o f  tim e w ith lim ited 
v aria tio n , and may th ere fo re  lose w hatever in fo rm atio n a l value they may have had 
at th e ir  o n set.
F inally , it is im p o rtan t to no te  th a t w ork in g  on a task is a necessary 
p re req u is ite  for any d ifferen ces in p erfo rm an ce  to  be m anifested . If  the individual 
does n o t en gage in the task to begin  w ith , as is likely to be th e  case  under severe 
d ep ress io n , any increased  accessibility  o f  adequate procedural know ledge, for 
ex a m p le , w ill be o f little  value.
Currently Active Coals
H o w ev er, aside from  the sp ecific  issues raised  above, it is obviously possible 
to  co n stru ct p lau sib le  excep tion s fo r m ost o f  th e  hypotheses o ffered . F o r exam p le, 
an au th o r w ho is try ing to  m eet th e  deadline for a ch ap ter revision m ay a ttem p t to 
rem ain  in an  analy tic  processin g  m ode, d esp ite being  in a good m ood as a result of 
o th e r  events. It seem s, how ever, that these co u n terexam p les usually p erta in  to the 
p o ten tia l im pact o f  cu rren t goals that an individual m ay pursue. It is th ere fo re  
im p o rta n t to  acknow ledge that o th e r  cu rrently  active goals o r  task requ irem ents 
may ov erride the im p act o f a ffectiv e sta tes. O f  course, th is  p ossib ility  is highly 
co m p a tib le  w ith  th e  fun ctionality  assum p tion  that underlies th e  p resen t line of 
argu m en t. N o te , how ever, that o n e  should e x p e ct an a sy m m etric  im pact o f 
p o sitiv e and negative states in this regard. I f  po sitive feelin g s in fo rm  th e  individ­
ual th a t no action  is needed, o v e r r id in g  th is m essag e because o f  o th e r  action
req u irem ents poses no problem . By con trast, if negative feelin gs in form  the 
individual about cu rren t p roblem s, ignoring  th is m essage would not be adaptive. 
A ccordingly, on e  may exp ect that th e  im pact o f negative feelin gs on  processing 
sty le will be m ore im m une to the influence o f o th e r  variables than  the im pact of 
positive feelings. A gain , this im plication  rem ains to be tested.
M oreov er, the sh o rt-te rm  and lon g -term  e ffec ts  o f  positive and negative 
exp erien ces need  to be d istinguished to avoid m islead ing conclusions. T h e  argu­
m en ts p resented  earlie r  suggest, for exam p le, th a t a success that is accom panied 
by feelin g  good may decrease analytic p rocessing  w hile the p erson  is in an elated 
m ood, but th is argu m en t certain ly  does not im ply th a t th e  p erson  may not engage 
in analytic e ffo rts  to ob ta in  additional successes. It seem s likely, how ever, that 
these e ffo rts  w ill be invested  a fter th e m ost in ten se  p ositive feelings d issipate, or 
that these feelin gs w ill be exp erienced  as less in ten se  on ce the individual engages 
in new effo rts .
Specific Emotions and th« Cognitive Asymmetry 
of Approach and Avoidance Situations
So  far, th e  d iscussion  has focused on th e  co nsequ en ces o f  g lobal "p o sitiv e "  or 
"n e g a tiv e " a ffectiv e sta tes. H ow ever, th e  p re sen t ap p roach  easily lends itse lf to 
th e  analysis o f sp ecific  em otio n s; if suggests th a t a p articu lar em o tio n 's  cognitive 
e ffec ts can  be predicted  on the basis o f  an analysis o f  the m eaning structure that 
underlies the em o tio n  (see O rtony e t  al., 1 988 ; S te in  & Levine, 1987), and the 
action req u irem en ts th at are associated w ith it.
A p articularly  in terestin g  possibility is suggested  by H ig g in s’s (1 9 8 7 )  d istinc­
tion betw een  "a g ita te d " and “dejected " n egativ e em otio ns. A ccording to his 
analysis, agitated  negative states, such as fear, th rea t, anger, o r edginess, result 
from  a th reat o f  negative outcom es. In  co n trast, d ejected  negative states, such as 
sadness o r d isap p oin tm en t, result from  a lack o f  p o sitiv e  outcom es. A ccordingly, 
agitated  sta tes should be associated w ith a m otiv ation  to avoid  negative outcom es, 
w hereas d ejected  sta tes should be associated  w ith  a m otiv ation  to approach  
positive outcom es.
A p p roach  and avoidance situ ations, how ever, are characterized  by a basic 
asym m etry  in the am o u n t o f analytic reason in g  th a t they require. W h en  we w ant 
to ob ta in  a certa in  p o sitiv e  ou tcom e, it is usually su ffic ien t to d eterm ine one  o f the 
m any p o ssib le  ways o f  ob ta in in g  the desired outcom e. K no w in g  on e way that is 
accessible to us gu arantees that we w ill ob ta in  th e  p o sitive ou tcom e, regardless o f  
w h ether o th e r  ways do o r do not exist. W h e n  w e w ant to  avoid a certain  ou tcom e, 
on  the o th e r  hand, we need to d eterm ine a ll  possib le  causal links that may 
produce this ou tcom e in  order to avoid it. B ein g  aw are o f just one process that may 
brin g  about th e  n egativ e outcom e, and bein g  able to block it, do not e lim in ate  the 
th reat as long as o th e r  processes may produce th e  sam e negative event. T h u s , we 
need to d eterm in e  al! processes that may g en era te  the negative ou tcom e, and for 
all o f  th em  we need to  find ap p rop riate  ways to block or to escape th eir im pact. 
A ccordingly, ap p roach  and avoidance situ ations show  a narural asym m etry in the
d egree o f analytic reason ing  that (hey requ ire (see  Lew icka, 1986 , for a related 
arg u m en t).
If so, it is conceivable that agitated negative affective states, w hich are usually 
associated with an avoidance m otivation , are m ore likely to trigger an elaborate 
analytic processing style than are dejected negative affective states, w hich are usually 
associated with approach m otivations; this may particularly be the case w hen 
avoidance in the form  of leaving the field is im possible and an im m ediate response is 
not required. M oreover, on e may assum e that agitated negative states focus individ­
uals’ atten tio n  on inform ation  that is relevant to an avoidance m otivation— nam ely, 
in form ation  that pertains to blocking  or escaping a negative ou tcom e— w hereas 
dejected negative states focus their a tten tion  on inform ation  that is relevant to an 
approach m otivation. U nfortu nately , the experience o f agitated and dejected states 
has been show n to be an interaction  effect o f  situational and individual variables (cf. 
H iggins, 1987), and studies tailored to provide sensitive tests o f the present hypoth­
eses w ithin this fram ew ork are not yet available.
Conclusions
In  sum m ary, the co n sid eration s o ffered  in the second p art o f  th is ch ap ter, and the 
lim ited  evidence th at bears on  th em , su ggest that individuals' affective State may 
in fluen ce th e ir  sty le o f in fo rm a tio n  p ro cessin g  (fo r  related  cla im s, see  F iedler, 
1 9 8 8 ; Isen , 1 9 8 7 ; K u h l, 1 9 8 3 ). T h e s e  influences may be conceptualized  by consid ­
erin g  th e  in form ativ e fu n ctio n s o f affective sta tes and their im p lications for 
individuals' in feren ces about th e  nature o f th e ir  p sychological situ ation  (Frijd a, 
1 9 8 8 ; H ig g in s , 1 9 8 7 ). If  n egativ e em o tio n s in form  th e  individual about a th reat of 
negative o r  a lack o f  p o sitiv e ou tcom es, they may activate the procedural k no w l­
edge th at is re lev an t to handling  these p ro b lem atic  situ ations. T h is  procedural 
know ledge may th e re fo re  be m ore  accessible in m em ory, increasing  the likelihood 
that the respectiv e p rocedures w ill be applied to  o th e r  tasks to  w hich they are 
ap p licable  w hile  th e  individual is in a negative affectiv e sta te . M o reover, individu­
als in a n egativ e s ta te  may ap p reciate  o p p o rtu n ities to d istract them selves from  
this s ta te  if th e  event th a t elicited  it can no t be changed , as is typical o f the 
e x p e rim en ta l m anip u lations used in  a ffect and co gn ition  research , and they may 
be m otiv ated  to  avoid risky novel so lu tion s in a situ ation  th at is already ch a ra cter­
ized as p ro b lem atic . As a result, o n e  finds th at individuals are  m ore likely to use 
e ffo rtfu l, d eta il-o rien ted , analytical p ro cessin g  stra teg ies spontan eously  w hen 
they are  put in a bad ra th e r  than  in a good m ood, but th at th e ir  reason in g  is 
ch aracterized  by a low er d egree o f  o rig in ality , creativ ity , and playfulness.
Positive a ffectiv e sta tes , on  the o th er hand, in fo rm  the individual that his or 
h er cu rren t e n v iro n m en t is a sa fe  place. A ccordingly, individuals in a good mood 
may be m ore likely to take risks and to use sim p le heu ristics in in fo rm ation  
processin g . M oreo ver, they m ay have b e tter access to a variety  o f d ifferen t 
p rocedural know ledge, given that no sp ecific  procedure is activated to cope w ith 
th e  cu rren t siru ation. In co m b in atio n , this may facilita te  th a t h ig h er creativity  that 
has been  observed under elated-m ood  co n d ition s, but may inh ib it the spontaneous
use o f  e ffo rtfu l, analytic p rocessing  strateg ies, unless those are  required by o th er 
active goals.
U nfortunately , the currently available evidence that bears on these speculations 
is lim ited. M oreover, alternative accounts can not be ruled out on the basis o f the 
available data. But it is encouraging to note that the assum ption that affective states 
may serve inform ative functions does provide a plausible and com prehensive fram e­
work for the conceptualization o f affective influences on inform ation processing.
M ost im p o rtan tly , the p resen t review su ggests th a t the in fo rm ativ e-fu n c- 
tions approach com bin es a num ber of advantages that may recom m end it as a 
heuristically  fru itfu l fram ew ork for future research . First, the basic assum ption  
that a ffective states may serve inform ative fu nctions is clearly  in line w ith a long 
trad ition  o f theo riz in g  about the nature o f em o tio n s  (see  Frijda, 1986, 1987, for 
review s). Second, the p resen t approach invites an exp licit consid eratio n  o f what 
sp ecific  in fo rm atio n  may be provided by d iffe re n t m oods and em otions. O ne may 
exp ect that cu rren t exp loratio ns of the co nd ition s g iving rise to d ifferen t em o ­
tions (e.g ., H igg ins, 1987 ; O atley Sc Jo h n so n -L a ird , 1987; O rtony e t  al., 1988; 
Sch ere r, 198-i; W einer, 19 8 3 a ), as well as research  on p eop le 's know ledge about 
their em otio n s (e.g., S te in  & Levine, 1 9 8 7 ), w ill result in a m ore p recise  under­
stand ing o f  em o tio n s ' respective in fo rm ation a l value. M oreover, these links may 
foster a m ore fruitfu l exchange betw een basic em otio n  research  and social- 
cogn itiv e research  than has been true for ap p roach es that m ake less co n tact w ith  
m ain stream  th eo riz in g  in the em otio ns d om ain . Finally, the in form ativ e-fu n c- 
tions ap p roach  p o ten tia lly  o ffers a parsim o niou s and unifying exp lan atio n  not 
only for the im pact o f m oods and em otio n s on various aspects o f p rocessing  style, 
but also for th e ir  im pact on evaluative ju d g m en ts— two areas o f research  that 
have so  far been treated  as separate.
A ccordingly, research into the interplay o f a ffect and cognition may profit from  
a serious consideration o f the inform ational im plications o f our feelings. A lthough 
the basic assum ption is all but new, its p otential has not yet been fully exploited.
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